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INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE
Since the first caveman's first headache, people have always
sought a cure for what ails them: a pill, a potion, a magic elixir that
heals disease and restores health and happiness. While no medical
panacea exists, the progress that modem science has made, and
continues to make, in creating therapeutic medicines is nothing
short of astonishing. The rapid pace of pharmaceutical innovation
over the last century has certainly redounded to the patient's
benefit and, a fortiori, to the pharmaceutical industry's profit. At
the same time, government institutions and policies have been
struggling to keep pace and address the social implications of
[Vol. 18
A CENTURY OF FDA REGULATION
industry advances through the regulation of and support for public
health needs.
As society grapples with the evolving and increasingly
sophisticated nature of the pharmaceutical industry, the "big
picture" in healthcare remains, of course, to take care of the
patient. Any and all medical decision making, therefore, should
follow the primary exhortation of the Hippocratic Oath: The first
thing is to do no harm.1  Although physicians are no longer
required to take the oath upon entering practice, its tenet must
remain at the forefront of modem medical care. Medical
prescribing decisions can be complicated, particularly when better
health outcomes are associated with increased costs. This truth is
evidenced by the cast of legislators, policymakers, insurers,
healthcare providers, and consumers who regularly weigh in on the
complex healthcare issues largely unforeseen by previous
generations. This Note will focus on the influence of the three
principal players on the pharmaceutical healthcare stage, each with
distinct and complementary roles: the physician as healer, the
public sector regulator as protector, and the private sector investor
as innovator.
Physicians, as licensed health care practitioners, are
professionally obliged to serve and protect the best interests of
their patients. Medical ethics dictate that a physician weigh the
benefit of any intervention against its potential harm in
determining a patient's course of treatment. Indeed, physicians
have wide discretion under law to make these types of individual
patient assessments. They can provide medical services and
prescribe approved drugs almost entirely as they see fit. This
professional autonomy is considered the cornerstone of medical
2practice .
Greek Medicine: The Hippocratic Oath. (Michael North trans., 2002),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek-oath.html. See also Hippocrates, Oath, in 1
HIPPOCRATES 299 (W.H. Jones trans. 1962).
2 For a review of how physicians established sovereignty over the domain of medical
practice through licensing laws, medical education requirements and private insurance
programs, see Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers
to Healthcare Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 445-49, 453 (1988) (broadly
delimiting the activity that constitutes medical practice as "diagnosing, treating, or
prescribing for any physical or mental condition") (emphasis added).
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Although doctors are under few direct regulatory controls
regarding the dispensation of their services and their prescribing
habits, other aspects of the United States healthcare system are
highly regulated by the public sector. The United States Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) is an agency of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, authorized by
Congress to promote the safety and efficiency of prescription drugs
and medical devices placed on the U.S. market.3  The FDA's
official mission is threefold: to protect public health by ensuring
that safe and effective products reach the market in a timely
manner; to monitor products for continued safety after they are in
use; and to help the public get the accurate, science-based
information needed to improve and maintain health.4 The FDA
strives to accomplish this mission through the use of product
standards and regulations, to delineate the requirements that the
pharmaceutical industry must follow, to control drug product
safety, and to provide accurate information to health professionals
and consumers.
Modem medical practice relies extensively on the use of
prescription drugs, which are marketed to physicians and
marketed, but not distributed, directly to consumers by private
drug manufacturers. 6 The FDA retains a large degree of regulatory
oversight of clinical practice, therefore, through its regulation of
drug products supplied by the private pharmaceutical industry.
The FDA has extensive authority over the advertising and
3 The FDA's authority is derived from a complex statutory and regulatory scheme, a
majority of which is embodied in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
399 (2004). See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
4 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (Supp. III 1994) (amended 1997) (codifying the FDA's mission).
See also An FDA Overview: Protecting Consumers, Protecting Public Health (2004),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fdal01/fdal01text.html (describing the FDA's public
health mission).
5 Id.
6 A drug manufacturer is a business entity, usually a pharmaceutical company, that
produces and prepares drugs for distribution from the original place of manufacture to the
person or entity who makes final delivery or sale to the consumer. See Thompson v. W.
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 381 (2002) (reviewing the definition of drug
manufacturing in various state statutes). For the purposes of this Note, a drug
manufacturer will generally refer to the private entity responsible for manufacturing,
distributing and promoting the drug(s) in question.
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marketing claims that drug manufacturers may make for all
approved pharmaceuticals, whether to patients or physicians. FDA
regulations mandate that all drug labeling claims, advertisements
and other industry-sponsored promotional statements provide
physicians with the necessary information to optimally prescribe
the drug products as approved and provide patients with adequate
directions for those uses. Taken together, the FDA's regulatory
reach over the private sector is panoptic-the FDA controls nearly
every aspect of communication that the drug industry has with
every prescriber and consumer of pharmaceutical products in the
United States.
An underlying premise of FDA regulation is that the public
needs protection from the products of the profit-seeking private
sector. The FDA's platform is limited, however, in that the agency
has neither the authority nor the capability to evaluate the
treatment needs of individual patients. As such, the FDA does not
seek to regulate the practice of medicine or to interfere with the
practitioner-patient relationship. 7 The FDA accepts that it is well
within a physician's discretion to prescribe any approved drug
product for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations not
included in the approved labeling. s Physicians are familiar with
the drug approval process and are deemed able to critically
evaluate the utility of a drug for specific treatment purposes. 9 As a
matter of policy, therefore, it is left to the physician's unfettered
discretion to prescribe an approved drug for an indication or in a
manner other than that for which it was approved, i.e., for "off-
7 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 396 (1997)) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit or interfere with
the authority of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed
device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate healthcare practitioner-
patient relationship.").
8 Once the FDA has approved a new pharmaceutical product for prescription sale and
use for one purpose, that product is available for physicians to prescribe it to patients for
other purposes. Id. The only exception to this rule is controlled substances (i.e.,
narcotics), which can only be legally prescribed for approved uses. See generally
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
9 Indeed, the FDA has often acknowledged that valid new uses for approved drugs are
often first discovered through serendipitous clinical observations. 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820
(Nov. 18, 1994) (citing FDA Drug Bulletin 12:4-5, 1982).
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label" use.' 0  By contrast, any direct promotion by a drug
manufacturer of off-label drug use is strictly barred. The FDA's
position is that any private industry promotion, e.g., labeling or
marketing, of unapproved drug uses may result in both physicians
and patients being unable to make informed and unbiased
decisions. 11
Off-label drug use is pervasive in the United States and both its
risks and benefits are widely recognized by many government
policies and practices. Many of these practices form the
centerpiece of federal health policy and, as such, can serve to both
exemplify and contextualize the ineradicable tension that exists
between public sector regulation of and private sector investment
in U.S. healthcare.
Longstanding controversies in the healthcare arena generally
turn on: (1) the acceptable level of regulatory oversight that
balances both the complex economic and policy demands of the
medical and pharmaceutical industries; and (2) the demands of
doctors to be protected from all forms of encroachment on their
medical judgments. Recent legislative measures have focused on
improving drug safety by tightening FDA supervision and/or
government enforcement of the production and dissemination of
information concerning off-label drug use by the private sector.
12
This Note will address such lawmaking as part of the larger issue
of balanced oversight in the pharmaceutical industry. It will
analyze the legal scope and ramifications of progressive
governmental regulation of the increasingly fecund and lucrative
business of the private pharmaceutical industry in three parts.
Part I will review the historical development of the FDA's
administrative authority and its increasingly expansive regulation
of pharmaceutical drug approval, labeling and marketing in the
United States. It will review the evolution of the FDA, from its
aboming role as a watchdog agency for labeling fraud to its full
10 "Off-label" use includes treating a condition not indicated on the FDA-approved
label, or treating the indicated condition but varying the dosing regimen, patient
population, or providing a drug combination other than as indicated in the label. Wash.
Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
tl See supra note 9, at 59,821-22.
12 See discussion infra Part III.
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grown position as the major regulator of drug marketing and
promotion. This part will examine the various social events that
have led to broadening amendments in FDA law over the past
century, including the rise of the generic drug industry and the
FDA's powerful influence over the commercial and marketing
warfare between branded pharmaceutical and generic drug
manufacturers. 
13
Part II will examine the overreach of the FDA's regulatory
scheme for controlling drug access and availability through the
regulation of information dissemination. It will describe the
changes in law that led to an upsurge in the promotional practices
of pharmaceutical manufacturers and the FDA's reactive attempts
to control those practices. It will review the various court rulings
that forced the FDA to yield to the First Amendment's directive to
let drug manufacturers disseminate information to, and
communicate with, prescribing physicians. This part will also
consider the proper influence of off-label drug promotion and use
on competitiveness in the drug marketplace and on the
practitioner-patient relationship.
Part III will examine the costs to all parties of the FDA's
regulation of drug manufacturers' promotional practices and of, at
least indirectly, physicians' prescribing practices. It will assess
both the medical and manufacturer liability associated with FDA
noncompliance, including the increasingly aggressive civil and
criminal enforcement measures being taken against both drug
companies and individuals. This part will examine current
legislative proposals for FDA reform and the policy considerations
underlying such reform, including the important need to improve
post-marketing testing and surveillance, to increase drug safety
research on the expanded uses of approved drugs and to incentivize
manufacturers to obtain regulatory approval of off-label uses.
13 A branded pharmaceutical manufacturer is one that invests in the research,
development, approval, and marketing of "innovator" or brand-name drugs. By contrast,
a generic drug manufacturer is one that typically does not engage in novel research but
instead copies the active ingredient in an already approved new drug to bring a competing
non-brand-name product to market. A generic drug contains the same active ingredient,
but not necessarily the same inactive ingredients, as the innovator drug.
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This Note will conclude by reflecting upon the need to strike a
politic balance between consumer protection, physician autonomy
and pharmaceutical industry freedom to communicate and
innovate. Such policies are certain to carry a heavy burden of
public interest because of their direct impact on the development,
availability and cost of prescription pharmaceuticals in the United
States.
I. THE FDA's ASCENSION TO POWER: THE HISTORY OF FDA
REGULATION OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY
The FDA has broad jurisdiction over three major categories of
products-foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetics. 14 The precise
boundaries of each of these areas are constantly being challenged
and refined by both the legislature and the courts.' 5 In order to
understand the current scope of the FDA's jurisdiction over
pharmaceutical access and availability, this Note begins by
examining how the FDA's authority over this area has evolved
historically.
14 As defined in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, the term "food" comprises
articles or components thereof used for food or drink for man or other animals, and
chewing gum. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2004). The term "drug" comprises "products intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, prevention of disease or otherwise
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." Id. §
321(g)(1). The term "device" comprises "any instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article"
intended for the same uses as drugs, above. Id. § 32 1(h). The term "cosmetic" comprises
"articles or components thereof intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled, or sprayed on,
introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part thereof for cleansing,
beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance," but excluding soap. Id.
§ 321(i).
15 For example, the legislature is currently addressing the issue of whether biologic
drugs, i.e., therapeutic protein products, should fall under the FDA's jurisdiction or
whether such complex proteins are sufficiently different from traditional drug products to
warrant exemption from FDA authority. See discussion infra notes 242-245. In the past,
the courts have also weighed in on the bounds of such authority, e.g., by specifically
excluding nicotine and tobacco products from the FDA's jurisdiction over drug products.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
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A. Labeling Fraud: The First Benchmark of FDA Regulation
In the late 1800's, there were few restrictions on drugs. Drugs
were branded as cure-alls, snake oils and elixirs that claimed to
relieve all ailments.' 6  In 1906, the Department of Agriculture's
Bureau of Chemistry, as forerunner of the FDA, was empowered to
regulate drugs under the Pure Food and Drugs Act ("the 1906
Act"). 17 That act prohibited interstate commerce in "adulterated"
or "misbranded" drugs. A drug was generally considered to be
adulterated if its strength, quality or purity differed from the
professional standard.18 A misbranded drug was one that was sold
under another name or sold without a label that properly listed the
quantity and proportion of the drug. 19 This latter definition was
later amended to also prohibit false or misleading claims regarding
the therapeutic effect of the drug.20 There was no distinction made
between prescription and proprietary, or over-the-counter, drug
products under the 1906 Act. 2 1 It provided for a general seizure
and disposal of products that violated its labeling requirements.
22
16 In fact, the avowed broad therapeutic effect of many drugs on the market was likely
attributable to the high alcohol content of the various medications at the time.
17 Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. 768, (1906) (repealed 1938),
available at http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/-hst203/documents/pure.html. The Bureau
of Chemistry changed its name to the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration in 1927.
This was then shortened to the Food and Drug Administration in 1931. In 1940,
jurisdiction over the agency was transferred to the Federal Security Agency, which later
became the Department of Health and Human Services. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa
Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:
Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 891
n. 12 (1996) (citations omitted).
18 The U.S. Pharmacopoeia and National Formulary published the official standards for
the strength, quality, and purity of drugs and for the tests to make such determinations.
These "USP" standards are still recognized today. See David L. Stepp, The History of
FDA Regulation of Biotechnology in the Twentieth-Century, 46 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 6,
(1999) (citing 21 U.S.C. § § 351 (a)-(b)).
19 Id. at 6-7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 351(j)).
20 The Sherley Amendment of 1912, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416 (1912). This amendment
was passed in response to the Supreme Court's ruling that the 1906 Act applied only to
false statements made about the identity of the drug (e.g., strength, quality, purity) and
not to statements as to curative effect (e.g., effective as a cure for cancer). See United
States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
21 Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Reform,
17 AM. J. L. & MED. 363, 375 n.69 (1991) (citation omitted).
22 The 1906 Act, supra note 17, at § 10.
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The Bureau of Chemistry did little to enforce this drug
regulatory regime in the midst of the pro-business political climate
of the 1920s. 23 Moreover, the government had the difficult burden
of proving misrepresentation. It had to monitor the manufacturer
to demonstrate actual fraud, which amounted to an after the fact
look at a product on the market.24 The 1906 Act served its
somewhat "laissez-faire" purpose of at least putting the public on
notice about the contents of commercially available drug products.
It did not, however, address either the safety or efficacy of the drug
products, other than in the context of false or misleading claims of
therapeutic effect. Despite its obvious shortcomings, the FDA
touts the 1906 Act as a "pillar of the Progressive era.,
25
The next major change in U.S. drug regulation occurred after a
healthcare crisis in 1937. In that year, many children died after
ingesting a liquid formulation of a publicly distributed drug that
had been tested for flavor, but not safety, before marketing.26 The
public outcry galvanized Congress to action-a disaster-based call
repeated in the context of drug regulation a number of times over
the following years. Congress recognized that the FDA's
authoritative reach needed to extend beyond labeling standards. It
needed to provide a substantive pre-marketing review of drugs.
Shortly thereafter, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the first
23 See Griffin, supra note 21, at 376.
24 Myron L. Marlin, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route to Drug Approval? 39 AM. U. L.
REv. 171, 175 (1989).
25 John P. Swann, The History of the FDA, in THE HISTORICAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT (George Kurian ed., Oxford University Press 1998), excerpt available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html. But see Marlin, supra note 24,
at 174 n.28 (describing the concerns of drug manufacturers that the 1906 Act would
severely curtail business).
26 The drug was an antibiotic known as sulfanilamide. The elixir contained
sulfanilamide powder dissolved in diethylene glycol to make it a palatable liquid for
children. Drug manufacturers did not know at the time that the liquid composition was
highly toxic and the 1906 Act was ineffective in preventing this disaster because it only
operated after the fact to police the adulteration or misbranding of items already on the
market. See Stepp, supra note 18, at 8-9. See also Joseph G. Contrera, The Food and
Drug Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How
Harmonious will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 927, 934 n.26 (1995) (noting that today ethylene glycol is most commonly used as
automobile anti-freeze).
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nationwide consumer protection law-the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).27
B. Drug Safety: The Second Benchmark of FDA Regulation
The FDCA required, for the first time, that drug manufacturers
test all new drugs for safety and provide the results of the testing to
the FDA in a New Drug Application (NDA), prior to bringing the
new drug to market. An NDA would include a description of the
drug's composition, the results of the safety testing, and the
manufacturing and quality control processes for the commercial
product. No new drugs could be marketed until proven safe for
use under the conditions described on the label and approved by
the FDA. In an effort to mollify the overwhelming concerns of
drug manufacturers, the FDCA grandfathered all drugs that were
already on the market from the new testing requirements, provided
that the drug's labeling retained the same representations
concerning the conditions of its use as it did when it was approved
under the 1906 Act.
2 8
The FDA reviewed each NDA for drug safety, but not efficacy.
If the NDA satisfied the regulatory criterion of safety and the FDA
took no action to reject the NDA within a fixed period of time after
its filing (typically sixty days), it became effective and the drug
was de facto approved for marketing. 29 Under the FDCA, the FDA
tightly controlled all aspects of drug marketing, mandating that the
drug product be labeled with extensive safety warnings and
directions for use. Drug manufacturers initially retained discretion
over the classification of drugs as prescription or non-prescription.
However, after several episodes of consumer misuse, an
amendment to the FDCA distinguished between drugs that could
be marketed with adequate directions for use by laymen and those
that were not considered safe for lay use even with directions.
30
27 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006)).
28 See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 894.
29 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1938) (amended 1994); Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v.
Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D.D.C. 1975).
30 Durham-Humphrey Amendment, ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2004)).
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The former class of drugs was categorized as non-prescription
drugs that could be dispensed over-the-counter ("OTC"). The
latter were categorized as prescription drugs that could only be
dispensed by a licensed medical practitioner (i.e., "Rx only"). 31
The FDCA created a new healthcare landscape and, effectively,
architected the FDA's role as guardian of public safety in the drug
industry. The FDCA also encouraged physician dependence, by
establishing new privileges for licensed physicians to become the
arbiters of the FDA's growing system of regulations for
prescription drugs. As a result, the medical profession enjoyed an
institutionalized and legitimized increase in status throughout the
1950's, when patients relied heavily on their physicians to
determine the proper treatments.
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry vehemently
opposed these FDCA mandated changes, arguing that the required
evidence of safety would cripple research efforts and delay getting
new drugs to market, not to mention undermine the consumers'
freedom to self-medicate.32 The standing of drug makers relative
to government regulators would continue to shift and reform over
the years, as the result of the FDA's ongoing attempt to create a
balanced level of public oversight of the healthcare industry.
The next major shift in FDA regulatory policy occurred in
response to another healthcare crisis, this time associated with the
sedative drug thalidomide. Thalidomide was a non-barbiturate
(and therefore non-addictive) sleep-aid that was widely used in
Europe in the late 1950's. Thalidomide was also widely prescribed
off-label to pregnant women across Europe to relieve morning
sickness. 33  By 1962, it had become clear that the drug was
teratogenic-it damaged the fetus and caused birth defects.34
Thalidomide was pending approval in the United States when this
31 id.
32 See Griffin, supra note 21, at 376. The pharmaceutical industry's cries of "the sky is
falling" became a leitmotif every time the FDA regulations were changed in future years.
The refrain is still being played today.
33 See Contrera, supra note 26, at 935 n.33.
34 Id. Thousands of babies were born with truncated limbs that resembled flippers.
The disease was known as phocomelia (Greek for "seal limb"). See also Stepp, supra
note 18, at 13.
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devastating aftereffect was discovered. 35 The fear of such an event
taking place in the U.S. spurred Congress to enact more stringent
drug regulation laws.
C. Safety and Effectiveness: The Third Benchmark of FDA
Regulation
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, also coined the Drug
Efficacy Amendments, essentially put in place the protectionist
system of drug regulation that we have today.36 They forbade the
shipment in interstate commerce of any new drug that the FDA had
not formally approved as to both the drug's overall safety and
efficacy. In order for a drug to meet these requirements, the drug's
sponsor needed to conduct three phases of clinical trials. Phase I
determined the toxicity of the drug in humans; Phase I tested the
therapeutic effect in patients with the target illness; and Phase III
consisted of an expanded series of typically blinded comparative
clinical trials with a wider range of patients. 37  Moreover, before
the human clinical trials could even commence, the drug's sponsor
was required to file an Investigational New Drug Application
(INDA), to approve the "investigational" use of the drug. The
INDA served as a request for FDA authorization to administer the
unapproved drug to humans.
The INDA itself required substantial data about the drug,
including its pharmacological activity and acute toxicity potential
in animals (so-called pre-clinical trials), along with information
detailing the use of good laboratory practices by the sponsor and
information on any previous human experience with the drug (e.g.,
35 FDA approval had been delayed pursuant to investigations on potential adverse
neurological reactions. In 1962, President Kennedy bestowed the Distinguished Federal
Civil Service Award on FDA physician Frances Kelsey, who delayed approval, even
though the delay may have been more bureaucratic than investigative. Steven B. Harris,
The Right Lesson to Learn from Thalidomide (1992), available at
http://w3.aces.uiuc.edu:8001/Liberty/Tales/Thalidomide.html.
36 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331-32, 348, 351-53, 355, 357-60, 372, 374, 376, 381
(1970)). For an enlightening discussion of the political landscape leading up to this
legislation, see Griffin, supra note 21, at 375-79.
37 The phases were often permitted to overlap. Long term toxicity tests in two species
of animals were also performed alongside the clinical trials. See Contrera, supra note 26,
at 935 n.35.
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marketing in another country). The TNDA was also required to
detail the course of the proposed human clinical trials. The FDA
and a local Institutional Review Board (IRB) needed to approve
the INDA before any shipment or administration of the drug for
diagnostic and therapeutic testing in humans, i.e., the clinical trials,
was permitted by law.
38
The subsequent NDA, for approval to market the drug, was
essentially a compendium of the INDA and the human clinical
data. The NDA contained detailed and extensive reports on the
animal studies and human trials; a description of the drug's
components, chemical formulation and manufacturing conditions;
and samples of the drug and of the proposed packaging. 39  The
FDA considered all of this information in assessing the drug's
effectiveness and safety for human consumption and in providing
appropriate clearance for labeling.4 °
The regulatory scheme of the Drug Efficacy Amendments gave
the FDA comprehensive control over all aspects of the design and
implementation of the pre-clinical research and subsequent clinical
trials route to the marketplace. 4 1 This process placed the ultimate
responsibility on the drug sponsor (usually the manufacturer) to
38 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970) (amended 2004) and 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(a)
(2007) (outlining general requirements for INDA submission). See also Stepp, supra note
18, at 13-14.
" 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970).
40 Consistent with the 1938 version of the statute, a de facto clause held that approval
(i.e., clearance for labeling) became effective if the FDA did not approve the application
or give the applicant notice of an opportunity for hearing within a fixed period of 180
days. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1970) (amended 1994). In post-1962 practice, however, this
clause had no real effect. The FDA always took some action on the application within
the fixed period that required some further action (e.g., additional testing) by the drug
sponsor. These requests served to delay the FDA's consideration and eventual issuance
of an order either approving the application or else refusing to approve the application.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970) (amended 1994). NDA applicants were frustrated with the
FDA's informal practice of restarting the clock each time additional information was
submitted in response to these, often multiple, FDA requests. The applicants, however,
were hesitant to press for a ruling that could be adverse. Thus, despite the standing
statutory requirement for the FDA to "consider" an NDA within six months, the actual
approval time was typically upwards of three years.
41 Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 901 (aptly noting that "[t]he FDA has maintained
tight control of this marketplace ever since [the FDCA was enacted] and. . . the 1962
Amendments have aided the FDA in this regard").
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provide sufficient evidence that the proposed drug was a safe and
effective therapeutic and had a risk-benefit profile appropriate for
42use to treat human disease. In the past, it was the physicians and
end-user consumers who had generally judged a drug's efficacy,
on a person by person basis. Under the new regime, all drug safety
and efficacy determinations were now comprehensively under the
aegis of the FDA.
Not surprisingly, the drug industry remonstrated the Drug
Efficacy Amendments ab ovo. Business interests trumpeted
familiar complaints about how the "drug lag" associated with the
new approval process would reduce pharmaceutical productivity
and competitiveness.43 Indeed, the expense and duration of the
human clinical trials shifted the burden to drug manufacturers to
determine drug efficacy prior to approval. The Drug Efficacy
Amendments also imparted more of the decision-making power to
the FDA, and took away some freedom of choice from the doctors
and patients.44  The FDA maintained that the broad brush
legislation, while sweeping in nature, was laudable in that it would
ensure that sufficient knowledge production about the
effectiveness of a drug preceded its diffusion into practice.
Regulatory critics concluded that the time and money spent by
drug manufacturers seeking FDA approval raised costs and caused
significant delays in drug development and in the introduction of
42 The drug sponsors' additional responsibilities included: selecting investigators to
perform studies on the drug; monitoring the progress of the drug tests; ensuring that the
investigators comply with the regulations; evaluating the evidence of the safety and
efficacy of the drug; detailing the results of the concluded studies in submissions to the
FDA; and discontinuing any investigation and use of the drug upon the discovery of
unreasonable and significant risk to the public (both pre- and post-marketing). See
Marlin, supra note 24, at 179-80.
43 See e.g., supra notes 25 and 32 and accompanying text.
44 Interestingly, the legislative intent of the Drug Efficacy Amendments was
purportedly, in part, to ensure that physicians would get ready access to reliable
information about drug products via the clinical trials data. During the congressional
hearings, numerous academic scientists testified in support of imposing a proof of
effectiveness requirement, criticizing the unreliability of impressionistic judgments about
drug efficacy made by individual physicians. See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology:
Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ.
L. REv. 373, 436, nn.270-72 (2002).
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new drugs on the post-1962 market. 45  Regulatory proponents
generally dismissed these criticisms as self-serving rhetoric and
argued that the social benefits of the Drug Efficacy Amendments
outweighed their potential costs. With the institutional memory of
the thalidomide tragedy still at the forefront of the debate, many
believed that the drug industry was operating under a business
paradigm that, if left unchecked, would certainly incur more drug-
related injuries. The FDA, thus, took a watchful, and perhaps
somewhat imperious, stance in vigorously enforcing the
prophylactic purpose of the Amendments.
On balance, the Drug Efficacy Amendments sought to mitigate
two opposing consumer health and safety risks inherent in the drug
approval process-the potential for inappropriate approval of
dangerous or therapeutically ineffective drugs and the potential for
undue delay in bringing safe and effective drugs to market.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has construed the nature and ambit of
the Amendments as requiring the FDA to prevent the marketing of
any drug where the potential for inflicting death or physical injury
is not sufficiently offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.
46
The Supreme Court reasoned that the safety of any drug inherently
depends on its therapeutic effectiveness for that indication and a
drug can be determined safe and effective based on the
45 See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The
1962 Drug Amendments, 81 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1049, 1049-91 (1973)
(concluding that the penalties imposed by the marketplace on sellers of ineffective drugs
prior to 1962 provided a sufficient deterrent to drug manufacturers and the FDA's
increased post- 1962 power was overly burdensome).
46 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979). In this class action suit,
terminally ill cancer patients sought to enjoin the Government from interfering with the
interstate shipment and sale of a drug (Laetrile®) that was not FDA approved. The
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that the safety and effectiveness
requirements of the FDCA had no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer patients
and instead held that the statute inherently encompassed treatments for terminal diseases
and did not foreclose all resort by patients to experimental cancer drugs for whom
conventional therapy was unavailing. ("Nothing in the history of the 1938 Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, which first established procedures for review of drug safety, or of the
1962 Amendments, which added the current safety and effectiveness standards in §
201(p)(1), suggests that Congress intended protection only for persons suffering from
curable diseases.") Id. at 552-53.
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circumstances of its use, e.g., to prolong life or reduce pain, in the
class of patient being treated.47
In other words, the FDA was not permitted to sidestep its own
regulations for terminally ill patients and peremptorily opt for
speed over safety. Rather, the FDA was required to assess the
safety and efficacy of any drug for the single and specific use for
which it was seeking approval. Thus, a drug for the treatment of
late-stage cancer, with long-term safety concerns or certain known
side effects, might be approved for use in terminally ill patients
because of the time-sensitive context of any efficiency
measurement for that use. By contrast, if the drug sponsor sought
approval for the same drug for treatment of a less severe or less
urgent problem, the FDA might find that the imputed benefits
would not outweigh the potential harm to the patient, given the
nonessential nature of the treatment in that population or for that
use.
48
D. FDA Regulation of New Drug Approval Under the Drug
Efficacy Amendments
In a concerted effort to craft an appropriate and timely drug
approval process, the FDA set forth specific guidelines to evaluate
the safety and efficacy of proposed drugs. Under these guidelines,
the FDA decided that safety could legitimately be evaluated on an
overall product basis, such that an approved product would be
deemed safe for all uses. By contrast, the FDA decided that the
efficacy requirement, newly introduced in the Drug Efficacy
Amendments, needed to be evaluated on the basis of a particular
therapeutic purpose, such that each new therapeutic use of a drug
required individual approval.49
47 Id. at 556-57 (describing the "special sense in which the relationship between drug
effectiveness and safety has meaning in the context of incurable illnesses").
48 Much later, in a mobilized response to the AIDS epidemic in the late 1980's,
Congress passed legislation that provided the FDA with additional resources to accelerate
the approval process for drugs to treat life-threatening diseases. Under the new law, the
FDA guaranteed that drug reviews would be completed within as little as six months for
life-saving drugs in priority review categories. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992). This law has been thrice renewed and
is still in place. See infra note 252.
49 See Stepp, supra note 18, at 14.
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Because proof of effectiveness was not generalizable to a given
drug product, the FDA introduced a process whereby the drug
sponsor had to file a Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA)
for separate FDA approval of each new therapeutic use of an
approved drug product, i.e., one the FDA had determined was safe
for all purposes but only effective for that approved use.5" As a
consequence, in order for a drug manufacturer to change the label
of an already-approved drug, or to market a new aspect of the drug,
the manufacturer was required to file an SNDA and obtain
approval for the change. New aspects of a drug that required a
label change and thus an SNDA included, inter alia, a new
indication, dosage, strength, formulation or manufacturing
51process.
Drug manufacturers loudly inveighed against the SNDA
process because SNDAs often took longer to approve than the
original NDAs. Drug manufacturers also incurred significant costs
complying with the SNDA regulations, which reduced the monies
that could be spent on research and development for new drugs or
for new uses of approved drugs. 52 Viewed through those lenses,
the supplementary regulations also served to delay the availability
of new treatments for patients while drug manufacturers spent time
50 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (1994). See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote
Pharmacological Research, to Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation
and Improvement, and to Reduce Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1007, 1029-30 (1994).
51 SNDAs had to be filed with specific Effectiveness Supplement Code Indications, to
identify the requested label change to be reviewed. Example Indications are as follows:
SE 1 = A new indication or a significant modification of an existing indication, including
removal of a major limitation to use, such as second line status (i.e., for patients who
have already tried one treatment).
SE2 = A new dosage regimen, including an increase or decrease in daily dosage or a
change in frequency of administration.
SE3 A new route of administration.
SE4 = A comparative efficacy claim naming another drug, including a comparative
pharmacokinetic claim.
SE5 = A change in sections other than the indications and usage section that would
significantly alter the patient population to be treated, such as addition of pediatric use
and/or dosing information or geriatric use and/or dosing information.
See FDA Drug Approvals List, Notes on Effectiveness Supplement Code Definitions,
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/da/da.htm.
52 See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 887-89 (enumerating the costs of regulatory
compliance).
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and money trying to expand the scope of FDA-approved drug
uses.
53
Complaints aside, the drug manufacturers had no choice but to
follow the SNDA process if they wanted to legally market a new
use for an existing drug product. Failure to file an SNDA and to
obtain FDA approval for the label change before a new use for a
drug was introduced into the market could result in the withdrawal
of the FDA's approval of the original NDA.54  Practically
speaking, the SNDA process served to further enhance the FDA's
regulatory control over drug labeling and the dissemination of
information concerning appropriate drug use under that label to
consumers and physicians.
The Drug Efficacy Amendments also provided for a
retrospective FDA review to assess the effectiveness of each of the
labeled uses claimed for drug products already on the market.55
Thus, in addition to reviewing the efficacy of new drugs, the FDA
also began to investigate the effectiveness of old drugs.56  The
practical intent of this look-back was to apply the efficacy
requirements introduced by the Amendments to drugs whose
market entry had required only a demonstration of safety under the
original FDCA of 1938. 57 Unlike the situation with the 1906 Act
and the FDCA, there was no large scale grandfathering.58
Pharmaceutical companies were given a two year grace period
following the enactment of the Amendments to submit scientific
53 The FDA has since created certain processes for obtaining expedited SNDA review,
if a delay in drug marketing due to the pre-approval requirement would result in an
"extraordinary hardship." Crimm, supra note 50, at 1099 n.105. Expedited review,
however, is used only in emergency situations, such as a potential out-of-stock situation.
Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (1994).
14 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970) (amended 2004).
55 See Am. Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (D.D.C. 1972).
56 See id.
51 Seeid. at 1314.
58 See id. The Drug Efficacy Amendments did grandfather certain drugs already in use,
but this exemption from the new approval requirements was highly limited and required,
inter alia, the drug to be already "generally recognized... [among qualified experts]...
as safe and effective under the conditions already prescribed, recommended or suggested
in the labeling." 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006); see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at
898-99.
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data in support of their efficacy claims.59  Initially, the drug
industry failed to comply, but after several extensions and
penalties, the vast outpouring of submissions overwhelmed the
FDA.60 To overcome the inevitable back log, the FDA outsourced
review of the data to expert panels established by the National
Academy of Science and National Research Council (NAS-
NRC).61
The expert panels reviewed each approved drug by class.62
NDA holders were invited to furnish the panels with the best
available scientific data to establish efficacy of their drugs. 63 On
the basis of that information, the panels applied a "substantial
evidence" test to determine whether the drug was effective for its
intended and labeled uses.64  If substantial evidence of
effectiveness was lacking, marketing clearance for the drug was
withdrawn.65  Because the manufacturer carried the burden of
providing the required substantial evidence of efficacy, the test was
intended to strengthen the protection afforded the public by
prohibiting the continued marketing of drugs whose effectiveness
had not been adequately established.66 A less sanguine view of the
review was that the required testing plucked the efficacy judgment
from the hands of physicians and consumers and placed it within
the stronghold of FDA regulation. 6
7
The stringent and highly controversial FDA review took years
to complete. Further, only a minority of the previously approved
drugs passed the "substantial evidence" test of efficacy upon first
59 Veneman, 349 F. Supp. at 1314.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 614 (1973).
63 Id. at 614-15
64 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2003) defines "substantial evidence" as: "evidence consisting of
adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such
experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling." Id. at 613 n.3.
65 See id. at 617.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 619.
[Vol. 18
A CENTURY OF FDA REGULATION
round review.68  Rather, most of the previously approved drugs
received intermediary classifications of "probably effective" and
"possibly effective," which required drug manufacturers to furnish
further data to establish efficacy to continue marketing.69  The
previously approved drugs that ultimately received favorable
efficacy determinations were permitted to remain on the market
under renewed NDAs.7 °
E. FDA Regulation of Generic Drug Approval Under the Drug
Efficacy Amendments
The Drug Efficacy Amendments did not contain a separate
approval process for drugs that were copies or "me-too"
counterparts of previously approved drugs.71  Before these
Amendments, once the FDA had approved a new drug's NDA for
safety, the FDA generally allowed "me-too" drugs-now called
generics-to enter the marketplace without systematic study, so
long as the generic equivalent was marketed under the same
labeling as the approved drug upon which it was patterned.72 The
reasoning behind this liberal market entry policy for generics was
based on a reading of the original FDCA, which defined a "new
drug" as any drug which was not generally recognized by experts
as safe.73 Thus, once a new drug had been approved for safety, the
68 See id. at 621. In total, the NAS-NRC had evaluated approximately 16,500 claims
made on behalf of the 4,000+ drugs that had been marketed pursuant to effective NDAs
in 1962. Seventy percent of the claims were found not to be supported by substantial
evidence of effectiveness, and only 434 drugs were found effective for all their claimed
uses.
69 See Am. Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (D.D.C. 1972)
(explaining that the process was interactive and that drug manufacturers whose drugs did
not pass the test were given additional time to either amend their labels or engage in
further testing and supplement the record to support a favorable efficacy determination);
see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 900 n.56 (indicating that manufacturers of
drugs found "probably effective" were given one year to submit efficacy data, while
manufacturers of drugs found "possibly effective" were given six months to do the same).
70 See Veneman, 349 F. Supp. at 1314.
71 See supra note 13 (defining generic or "me-too" drugs).
72 Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture
of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1772 (1996).
73 The scientific experts' recognition now encompasses an efficacy component, and is
commonly referred to as "GRASE" or "generally recognized as safe and effective." See
supra note 58.
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generic copy of that drug was considered to have passed the
"generally recognized" standard of safety for marketing.74
The new efficacy requirements for drug approval presented a
significant challenge for the FDA because the universe of pre-1962
drugs included not only the aforementioned 4000+ previously
approved innovator drugs but also nearly ten times as many me-too
drug products that were on the market without formal FDA
approval.75  In a makeshift decision that reflected strapped
resources as much as simple fairness considerations, the FDA
allowed those previously marketed generic drugs to remain on the
market once the FDA had granted their corresponding innovator
drugs renewed efficacy approval.76 The burden of providing the
substantial evidence of efficacy rested exclusively with the
innovator drug manufacturer and allowed the generic to ride on the
innovator's coattails.
This system broke down when the innovator drug failed to
satisfy the new effectiveness requirement and was forced to
withdraw the drug from the market. Following a series of lawsuits
by pharmaceutical manufacturers, whose NDA approvals had been
withdrawn for failure to show the required efficacy, the Supreme
Court held that generic copies of those drugs had to withdraw from
the market as well, because it would be patently unjust to exempt
the generics alone from the new efficacy requirements.77
74 See generally Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185
(1971). Generic manufacturers either concluded independently that their products were
generally recognized as safe, because an NDA was in effect for a version manufactured
by another company, or else they obtained an opinion from the FDA that their drugs were
not "new" but "old" drugs that were by definition already generally recognized as safe.
The FDA kept no record of these "old drug" opinions, but apparently issued several
thousand between 1942 and 1962. Id. The FDA later issued a statement of policy
formally withdrawing the holdings of the "old drug" opinions in 33 Fed. Reg. 7758 (May
28, 1968). Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 310.100 (2007).
75 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 1772.
76 See, e.g., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Drugs for Human Use
Containing, Quercetin, Hesperidin, or Bioflavonoids, 33 Fed. Reg. 818 (Jan. 23, 1968)
(stating that the first implementation notice covered the approval of all me-too drugs for
one group of drugs [bioflavonoids] with renewed efficacy approval).
77 The Supreme Court articulated this holding in a series of four decisions, all decided
on June 18, 1973. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609
(1973); Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm.,
Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); USV Pharm. Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973).
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Following these decisions, the FDA then announced that, going
forward, it would apply the "new drug" requirements of the Drug
Efficacy Amendments uniformly to all drugs, including identical,
related, or similar drug products of previously approved innovator
drugs.
Because the Drug Efficacy Amendments extended the
definition of a new drug to require proof of both safety and
effectiveness, there was uncertainty about how to review the
previously marketed generic drugs that inherently did not make
novel therapeutic claims.78  The FDA realized that it would be
impossible to apply the new standards to all generic drugs on a
case-by-case basis, based on sheer volume alone.79  But the
Supreme Court had clearly ruled that all "new drugs" were subject
to the NDA requirements, intimating that generic drug
manufacturers had to perform the same or similar studies as
innovator pharmaceutical manufacturers to independently prove
the safety and efficacy of the generic drug. 80 The FDA, and by
extension the generic drug industry, were stuck between a rock and
a hard place.
Initially, generic drug companies attempted to nominally
satisfy the "new drug" requirements by filing so-called "paper"
NDAs, in which the generic applicant relied upon published data
concerning the safety and efficacy of the previously approved drug
as proof that its own, identical product was safe and effective.8 1
However, most of the innovator's data were not published, were
protected by trade secret law and, thus, were not readily available
for most approved drug products. 82 Therefore, in an effort to make
78 See Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 650.
79 There existed between 100,000 and 500,000 of those products, few of which the
FDA had approved for safety and efficacy before marketing-the generics had merely
come to the market under the same label as the innovator. Id.
80 See supra note 74; see also Beth Understahl, Authorized Generics: Careful Balance
Undone, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 355, 361 (2005).
81 See Understahl, supra note 80, at 361-62.
82 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 1866 n.68. The FDA recognized that while generic
drugs needed to be approved, to avoid prolonging the innovator/brand name drug's
market monopoly, approving the generics on the basis of clinical trial data supplied (and
paid for) by the pharmaceutical manufacturer of the innovator drug was tantamount to
appropriating its property. Id.
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it easier for the generics to remain on the market and to avoid
requiring duplicative clinical testing, while still maintaining the
mandated legal consistency, the FDA devised the concept of an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). 83
ANDAs represented the first statutory attempt to regulate the
generic drug industry, albeit using standards less rigorous than
those used to regulate the innovator industry. The ANDA was
significantly less onerous than the NDA and was initially only
available for generic drug manufacturers who had copies of pre-
1962 drugs on the market.84 ANDAs did not require safety and
effectiveness data as long as the copy of the innovator drug
possessed the same physiological properties-bioavailability and
bioequivalence-as the innovator drug. 85  The ANDA required
evidence that the generic drug had the same active ingredients,
bioavailability, strength and dosage form as the listed drug upon
which it was patterned; that the generic was bioequivalent to the
reference listed drug; and that it was made in conformity with
current good manufacturing practices. 86
Despite the FDA's best efforts, difficulties still arose with this
system. Companies selling generic drugs could not even begin the
abbreviated approval process until after patents on the branded
drug had expired. Although the FDA had already approved the
active ingredients used in the generic drugs, the generic
manufacturers still needed to use the active ingredient of the
innovator drug to conduct their own bioequivalence and
manufacturing tests. A generic manufacturer took the risk of
having a patent infringement suit filed against it by an innovator if
83 Regulations governing the filing and content of ANDAs were adopted in February
1969 but were not actively practiced until the mid 1970's. See Abbreviated Application,
34 Fed. Reg. 2673 (Feb. 27, 1969) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970)).
84 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 1866 n.68.
85 See Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890, 892-93 (D.D.C.
1975). "Bioequivalence" meant that the active ingredient is absorbed at the same rate
and to the same extent for the generic drug as for the innovator drug. "Bioavailability"
meant the rate or extent to which the active ingredient in a drug becomes available to the
site of drug action in the human body. See id. at 893 n.5.
86 At first, labeling and manufacturing information was deemed sufficient evidence to
assure the FDA that individual generic versions contained the same active ingredients as
the innovator products. Later, test data was required. See id.
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the generic began using the branded drug in tests before the drug
patent expired. 7
An interim policy promulgated by the FDA attempted to
mitigate this issue by implicitly allowing the introduction of
generics in interstate commerce before approval of its ANDA,
reasoning that the generic drug was not actually a "new drug" and
therefore could be given pre-approval marketing clearance.88 The
FDA reasoned that its compliance resources were limited and
should be concentrated primarily in those areas where potential
health problems exist, rather than in policing the distribution of
copies of approved drugs that had been found safe and effective. 89
As a result, large classes of generic drugs flooded the market with
every NDA (i.e., innovator drug) approval. 90
Not surprisingly, a high profile lawsuit by the innovator
pharmaceutical manufacturer Hoffmann-LaRoche called for an end
to this pre-approval marketing clearance practice with some
fanfare. In Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, the D.C.
district court entered summary judgment for Hoffmann-LaRoche,
holding that the FDA's pre-approval marketing clearance practice
was in clear violation of the FDCA's requirements of approving a
drug for safety and efficacy before marketing.9 1 It concluded that
the statutory approval mandate before marketing applied even if
the generic drug was the chemical equivalent of an already
approved drug.92  In its decision, the Hoffmann-LaRoche court
recognized the potential anticompetitive effects of the ruling,
particularly with regard to the extended patent protection that
would accrue to the drug company plaintiff and to other drug
manufacturers with approved NDAs. However, the court
sidestepped addressing these future implications, reasoning that the
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 892.
90 See id; see also supra note 72. It was estimated that in the mid-1970's, five to
thirteen such "pre-approved" generic drugs existed for every new drug that had an
approved NDA. Hoffmann, 425 F. Supp. at 892.
9' Id. at 894.
92 See id. at 894-95.
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overriding interest at hand was to ensure the health and safety of
the public through compliance with the FDCA.93
As a result of Hoffmann-LaRoche, the late 1970's and early
1980's were halcyon years for Big Pharma-a name coined at
around this time to describe pharmaceutical companies with big
profits and large research and development expenditures. During
that time, Big Pharma successfully kept generic drugs off the
market while their innovator pharmaceutical patents, claiming the
relevant branded drug products and processes of making or using
them, were in force.94 Because generic manufacturers could not
even begin the appropriate bioequivalence and associated testing
required for FDA approval until after the relevant patents had
expired, the FDA regulations effectively extended the patent term
of the brand-name drug and unduly delayed generic competition
for some years after expiration of the relevant patents. As a result
of the increasing dearth of generic drugs in the "monopolized"
pharmaceutical marketplace, patients, as drug consumers, faced
steadily increasing costs. By the early 1980.'s, the FDA estimated
that there were approximately 150 brand-name innovator drug
products whose patents had expired, yet, for which there was no
generic equivalent on the market.
95
This improvident system of de facto patent term extension and,
by extension, delayed generic market entry and sustained higher
drug prices, provoked another generic-branded court dispute. This
one, like the one before it, eventually resulted in another
momentous shift in FDA law. The Roche Products v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co. case involved a suit between a large
93 See id. at 895. The court essentially forecast the legal imbroglio that would come to
a head at the soon-to-be created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal
Circuit"). See Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
94 A brand-name drug is usually "covered" by a series of patents, which can include:
product patents (covering the active ingredient of the drug), process patents (covering the
process of manufacturing the drug), method-of-use patents (covering a particular method
of using the drug), and formulation patents (covering both the active and inactive
ingredients in a drug, e.g. a final dosage form tablet or capsule).
95 By that time, only fifteen generic equivalents had been approved for post-1962
drugs. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 at 16 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2649.
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pharmaceutical company (Roche) and a manufacturer of generic
96drugs (Bolar). Roche sought to enjoin Bolar from using its
patented drug in the bioequivalence and manufacturing studies
necessary to market, after expiration of the Roche patent, a generic
version of Roche's branded drug Dalmane®, a sleeping pill.
97
It was perhaps not surprising that the newly-created Federal
Circuit, charged with the task of unifying (and in effect
strengthening) the patent system, held for patentee Roche and
enjoined Bolar from beginning its FDA mandated bioequivalence
tests until the patent on Roche's drug's active ingredient had
expired. The pro-patent Roche Court reasoned that such
bioavailability testing constituted a prohibited infringing use of the
patented drug product. The Federal Court explicitly refused to
create a so-called "experimental use" exemption to United States
patent laws for the testing of generic drugs, to counteract the
unbalanced FDA laws, as Bolar had argued, because such
"legislative activity [was] proper only for the Congress." 99
F. Generic/Innovator Forced Compromises-The Hatch- Waxman
Amendments
Impelled to action by the Roche decision, and urged ahead by
public pressure and industry lobbying, Congress swiftly passed the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Amendments."'100 The
portion of the legislation that overruled the Roche decision was
96 See Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d at 860.
97 Id.
98 The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 as the appellate court with nation-wide
jurisdiction for all patent-related cases. The court was formed by the merger of the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the
United States Court of Claims. See About the Federal Circuit,
http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
99 Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d at 863-64. Generic manufacturer Bolar unsuccessfully
argued that the "traditional" experimental use exception had been created at common law
and deserved to be followed as a guiding (if not binding) precedent, to respect the public
policy favoring generic drugs.
100 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended throughout 15, 21,
28, and 35 U.S.C.). Amendments were made to both the FDCA and the Patent Laws in
an effort to engineer a statutory compromise in both areas of law. The Hatch-Waxman
Amendments embody this compromise.
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pushed through Congress as an addendum to a set of provisions to
a patent term extension bill that had already cleared the Senate.'
0
'
The resulting Amendments were much broader in scope and
application than the originally crafted legislation. The Hatch-
Waxman Amendments served to establish a regulatory framework
that afforded consumers improved access to affordable prescription
drugs, while balancing the incentives for continued innovation by
research-based pharmaceutical companies with opportunities for
market entry by generic drug manufacturers.
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments created a statutory "safe
harbor" from patent infringement, inter alia, to enable a generic
drug manufacturer to make and use the innovator drug's active
ingredient in bioequivalence and other studies required to meet the
ANDA requirements, while the innovator drug's patent was still in
force. 10 2  The Amendments also shortened the period needed to
obtain generic drug approval, by affirmatively allowing ANDA
filers to rely on the safety and efficacy data compiled in the brand-
name pharmaceutical manufacturer's NDA, whether published or
not. 0 3  At the same time, the enforceable patent term for the
innovator drug could be extended to make up for patent life lost
during the lengthy and expensive approval process for the
innovator drug.10 4  To achieve both objectives of this balanced
compromise-regulating time did not bum patent term or allow
patent extension-a set of complex procedures were established by
101 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 188 (1999).
.02 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984) (exempting from patent infringement tests and
investigations conducted by the ANDA filer solely for uses "reasonably related" to
generating data for obtaining FDA approval). In fact, the language of § 271(e)(1) does
not restrict the "safe harbor" to generic companies and ANDA filers. It applies to any
uses "reasonably related" to submission of information to the FDA. See Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005).
103 Compare supra note 82, with 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (1984) (stipulating that ANDA
filers are not required to repeat the animal and clinical testing using an already-approved
drug ingredient or dosage form, as ANDAs do not contain clinical studies, but instead
ANDA applicants must establish bioequivalence to the innovator drug). In general,
bioequivalence data allows the ANDA filer to piggyback on the innovator drug
manufacturer's approval and safety and efficacy data, published or unpublished.
'04 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1984) (governing patent term extensions).
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statute to streamline any patent infringement issues occasioned by
the planned generic entry into the market.'
0 5
While Hatch-Waxman endeavored to accelerate the FDA's
approval of generic drugs, while preserving incentives for
continued investment in new drugs, in practice, it further
empowered the FDA in its regulation of the pharmaceutical
industry, which now actively included innovator drug companies
and generic drug companies, alongside prescribing physicians and
consumers. The FDCA as amended sought to encourage greater
expenditure in the area of pharmaceutical innovation, by granting
longer effective patent terms while simultaneously encouraging
generic drug development and ensuring greater competition in the
sale of safe and effective drugs in the pharmaceutical
marketplace. 10 6  Although it is an exaggeration that the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments created the generic drug industry, it is
indisputable that they served to greatly bolster the competitive
forces surrounding generic drug entry.'0 7 With this sea change, the
FDA expanded to fill the regulatory space surrounding the
105 For a detailed discussion of the patent infringement issues under Hatch-Waxman, see
Katherine A. Helm, Outsourcing the Fire of Genius: The Effects of Patent Infringement
Jurisprudence on Pharmaceutical Drug Development, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 153, 174-82 (2006).
106 For example, the Hatch-Waxman amendments made the filing of an ANDA an act of
constructive patent infringement that allowed the innovator drug manufacturer to sue the
generic. It also provided for a five-year period of data exclusivity for new drug entities,
i.e., the innovator drug, and a three year period for supplements requiring clinical trials,
before a generic could be approved. In addition, the FDA could not approve the generic
for the lesser of 30 months after the ANDA filing, patent expiration, or a court holding of
patent invalidity (the "30 month stay"). This allowed the generic drug manufacturer to
file an ANDA before the patent term expired while giving the innovator pharmaceutical
manufacturer the chance to enforce its patents against the generic to prevent marketing
before valid patent expiration. These stop gaps took some pressure off the FDA to
expedite approval of generics in their attempt to promote competitive prices for safe and
effective drugs. See id. at 173-82 & n.89. Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
fostered generic entry into the market by giving the first ANDA filer a 180 day period of
market exclusivity vis-A-vis other generics. This made first generic entry much more
profitable. It also led to many abuses in this "balanced" system. Id.
107 Generic drugs now comprise at least 50% of the prescriptions filed for
pharmaceutical products, up from 19 percent in 1984. See Federal Trade Commission,
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, July 2002, available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see also supra note 96.
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seemingly incompatible goals of drug safety, efficacy, access and
availability.
As this Note has tried to demonstrate, during the first half of
the 20 th  century, Congress steadily expanded the scope and
breadth of the FDA's regulatory authority to cover all aspects of
drug approval, labeling and marketing, in efforts to protect public
health and safety. One consequence of the regulations is that the
generic drug industry has become an established part of the
pharmaceutical industry. The FDA has now also taken on the role
of an overarching guardian, to try and maintain the balance
between the competing interests of generics and innovators as part
of its public health mandate. As generic drug approval has diluted
the duration of the innovator's market exclusivity and thus their
time to recoup the costs of drug development and approval, much
of the focus has shifted to competition and increasing regulations
with regard to drug marketing. The next Part will explore the
FDA's regulatory role in this area.
II. OVERSTEPPING THE BOUNDS: THE FDA's OVERBROAD
REGULATION OF DRUG ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY
As chronicled in Part I, it is indisputable that over the last
century, increasingly expansive FDA regulations have increased
the cost and time required to bring new drugs-and to authorize
new uses of approved drugs-to market. In 1906, there was no
drug pre-approval process. A century later, in a generally more
competitive and risk averse climate, the process is more tightly
regulated, staggeringly time-consuming, and overwhelmingly
expensive. Moreover, generic drug entry is occurring earlier in the
drug lifecycle, i.e., in many cases prior to patent expiration.108 The
108 An increasingly contentious area of litigation is the surge in pharmaceutical patent
challenges mounted by ANDA applicants seeking to market generic versions of approved
drugs while the patents on the approved drug or its use are still in place. Under Hatch-
Waxman, ANDA filers wishing to enter the market before valid expiration of the
innovator drug manufacturer's patents must include in their ANDA a "Paragraph IV
certification" that the innovator's relevant patents are invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, sale or offer for sale of the generic product. 21 U.S.C. §
355()(2)(A)(vii)(IV). Nowadays, the lion's share of these "Paragraph IV" patent
challenges are being mounted against the innovator's secondary or second-generation
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overall effect of this early competition from generic drug
manufacturers on pharmaceutical drug prices is titanic. It is felt by
consumers, government and private healthcare insurers, hospitals,
doctors, lawyers, lobbyists, and the whole of the healthcare
industry. This increase in competition has directly resulted in
more aggressive attempts to capture and police the pharmaceutical
market.
A. The Rise of Pharmaceutical Advertising
Pharmaceutical manufacturers seeking to keep their corner on
the drug market have come to realize that the dilution of the market
by generic competition can be mitigated by certain factors,
including the physicians' and the patients' familiarity with the
branded drug as compared to a generic drug. Consequently,
pharmaceutical companies have aggressively focused their major
efforts on drug marketing and promotion tactics, both to
prescribing physicians and to consumers. Drug manufacturers are
well aware that successful promotional techniques can mold
prescribing habits for the lifetime of a drug, which can, in turn,
increase long term revenue and encourage investors.' °9  In
addition, major pharmaceutical companies have become
increasingly sophisticated at analyzing their drug portfolios to
identify potential "blockbuster" products that will be able to
generate the returns needed to recoup past investments and spur
future research investments, before generic competition enters the
scene. 
110
patents. See generally Denise L. Loring & Katherine A. Helm, Second Generation
Pharma Patents, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.ropesgray.com/secondgenerationpharmapatents/.
109 See BARRY R. FuRROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 203
(West Group Publishing, 5th ed. 2004).
110 "Blockbuster" drugs are generally defined as brand-name drug products with annual
gross sales of $1 billion or more. Less than 100 drug products on the U.S. market are
blockbusters. See Blockbuster Drug, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockbuster-drug (providing examples on the market today
include Allegra® (Aventis), Advair® (GlaxoSmithKline), Avonex® (Biogen Idec),
Duragesic® (Johnson & Johnson), Epogen® (Amgen), Fosamax® (Merck), Lipitor®
(Pfizer), Nexium® (AstraZeneca), Pravachol® (Bristol-Myers Squibb) and Zyprexa®
(Eli Lilly)) (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
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For decades, drug manufacturers promoted their products
directly and exclusively to physicians, in an attempt to influence
their prescribing habits and, in turn, consumer sales of their drugs.
In the 1980's, pharmaceutical companies proposed that the FDA
allow advertising directly to consumers, arguing that the public
should not be denied access to the latest scientific information and
knowledge."' Although product-claim advertisements were not
barred from broadcast mediums, a tangle of thorny regulations
concerning the required disclosure of product labeling information
on risks and benefits made it prohibitively difficult to air television
advertisements. In 1997, the pharmaceutical industry triumphed
when an FDA policy change made "direct-to-consumer" (DTC)
advertising feasible. 1 2 Prescription drug manufacturers responded
promptly and swiftly by promoting their prescription drug products
through a variety of mediums, including newspaper, magazine,
television and later, internet marketing. DTC advertising quickly
became a hugely successful promotional tool of drug
manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere.'13
To date, DTC advertisements have mostly been channeled
through mass media, particularly broadcast television. In the
future, DTC advertising is likely to mirror drug evolution and
become more personalized, with targeted demographic profiling
and messages tailored for specific patient populations. Many
companies have begun promoting the use of targeted, autologous
drug therapies through the concept of personalized medicine, in
part response to their ostensibly waning pipelines for the large
111 See JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDOSED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 150 (HarperCollins 2004).
112 See Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs. et al., Guidance for Industry: Consumer-
Directed Broadcast Advertisements (1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.htm; see also Janice Hopkins Tanne, Direct
To Consumer Drug Advertising Is Billion Dollar Business in US, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 805
(1999).
113 The United States, New Zealand, and Canada are, to a limited extent, the only
developed countries that permit DTC advertising of prescription drugs. Europe is
currently considering allowing DTC advertising for certain prescription drugs. See
generally DTCA Index, http://haiweb.org/campaign/DTCA/index.html (last visited Sept.
12, 2007).
[Vol. 18
A CENTURY OF FDA REGULATION
market "blockbuster" drugs.'" 4 The personalized medicine concept
is based on using genetic and other diagnostic tests to determine,
before a prescription is written, how a patient will respond to a
particular drug treatment and how a treatment can be
individualized based on a patient's molecular, genetic, disease, or
metabolic profile. 11 5 Biotechnology companies have taken a lead
role in developing and promoting personalized medications, in an
attempt to become major players in the healthcare market, instead
of serving as mere research facilities or early stage drug
developers."1
6
Since the late 1990's, Big Pharma has worked to maintain their
foothold in the healthcare market by heavily investing in DTC
advertising, but also by expanding their sales forces for detailing
(i.e., meeting directly with) physicians.' 17  These physician-
industry interactions are rife with potential conflicts between the
drug sellers and the physicians-the entry point to market. 18
114 See Rex Nutting & Emre Peker, Finally, Drug Prices Are Cooling Off. How
Americans Could Save Billions of Dollars in Out-Of-Pocket Costs, MarketWatch from
Dow Jones, July 20, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/
story.aspx?guid=%7BD4B98AFA%2DD862%2D4E22%2DAD06%2D 17166872504E%
7D&siteid=rss (documenting the leveling off of pharmaceutical profits, due to fewer
blockbuster drugs, and assessing the pipeline of major drugs set to be approved as largely
"niche" [i.e., personalized] drugs to fight cancer.)
115 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of
Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753 (2006).
116 For example, Genzyme Corporation is a biotech company that has become well
known for its development of diagnostic tests to help physicians individualize treatments
by predicting patient responses to targeted cancer therapies. In 2006 alone, Genzyme
introduced six new personalized medicine tests across a range of cancer types. See,
Overview of Genzyme Corporation, Genetics/Diagnostics, available at
http://www.genzyme.com/corp/structure/corporateoverview.asp (last visited Sept. 12,
2007).
117 For a historical review of drug detailing as a promotional mechanism, see Lars Noah,
Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements
of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 309-16 (1992).
118 The marketing practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers often include industry-
sponsored gifts to physicians, in the form of drug samples, meals, conference travel,
educational programs, research funding, and honoraria. Many studies have demonstrated
that the sponsoring drug company's products are favored by participating physicians. See,
e.g., M.A. Bowman & D.L. Pearle, Changes in Drug Prescribing Patterns Related to
Commercial Company Funding of Continuing Medical Education, 8 J. CONTMINUING
EDUC. HEALTH PROF. 13-20 (1988); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical
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Many patients do not have a high degree of literacy with regard to
medical care, and thus rely on their physicians to interpret drug
information. While DTC advertisements are primarily used to
promote so-called pharmaceutical "brand awareness," physician
detailing is still heavily relied upon to directly secure high volumes
of drug prescriptions.
In deciding when, where, and how to treat their patients,
physicians not only determine their short-term treatment needs, but
they also ultimately create the long-term demand for prescription
drug insurance coverage." 9  As a result, individual practitioners
collectively control, directly or indirectly, the vast bulk of
healthcare expenditures in the United States.' 20  The collective
influence of physicians has become even more prominent as total
spending on prescription drugs has increased-a 54% increase
since 2001, compared with a 43% increase in spending on
healthcare other than drugs, according to the federal Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services. 12 In 2006, prescription drugs
accounted for just over 10% of the $2.2 trillion spent on
healthcare. 122 As long as this trend continues, physicians will
continue to remain a foremost target for pharmaceutical drug
company marketing campaigns.'
23
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 55 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 483, 484
(2000).
119 See also Hall, supra note 2, at 434.
120 Physicians control approximately two-thirds of national healthcare costs. These
healthcare costs include expenditures for physician services (which, in 1997, represented
approximately 20% of healthcare dollars spent or $220 billion); hospital costs (40% or
$371 billion, the largest piece of the healthcare pie); and pharmaceutical drug
prescriptions, the fastest growing expenditure (8% or $80 billion). See Hall, supra note 2,
at 434 ("[I]nformed estimates place 70 to 90 percent of health care expenditures within
the control of individual practitioners."); see also Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies, Health Care Expenses in the U.S.
Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population, 1997. Rockville (MD), 2001. AHRQ Pub. No.
01 -R086.
121 See supra note 114.
122 See id.
123 In 2000, pharmaceutical firms spent a total of $8.5 billion on marketing. Most of
these funds were spent on physician-industry interactions. Alice LaPlante, Marketing
Directly to Physicians Reaps Higher Returns for Drug Companies, Stanford Graduate
School of Business Marketing Research (Aug. 2006),
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/mktg-narayanan-pharmaceuticals.shtml.
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B. FDA Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising
As pharmaceutical manufacturers have developed more
aggressive marketing tactics, the FDA has become more
aggressive in exercising its regulatory authority over the various
forms of drug marketing and advertising to physicians and
consumers. The FDA's current authority to regulate the
manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs includes sweeping
oversight over the promotional labeling and advertising claims
made on behalf of approved drugs. 124 By FDA mandate, a drug
can only be advertised or represented for its approved purposes,
i.e., for the conditions for which it has been proven safe and
effective. 125 No implied claims or suggestions may be made if
there is inadequate evidence of safety or a lack of substantial
evidence of effectiveness. 126 Any claim or representation made in
a promotional advertisement must, therefore, be wholly consistent
with the approved product labeling.
127
The FDCA broadly defines labeling as "all labels and other
written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its
containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."'128
Indeed, the courts have long held that information need not be
included with the actual drug product for it to be considered
labeling. 129 Increasingly, the regulatory and judicial trend has been
to construe "labeling" expansively, such that labeling now
encompasses nearly every form of promotional activity, including
package inserts, booklets, pamphlets, mailing pieces, bulletins,
reprints of academic articles, and all other literature that
supplements, explains, or is otherwise textually related to the
product. 1
30
124 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (n) (1971) (labeling and advertising, respectively).
125 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d) (2001).
126 § 201.56(a)(3) (2001).
127 § 202(1)(e)(3)-(4) (1996).
128 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m) (2000).
129 See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350 (1948) (The court held that a
manufacturer can be found guilty of misbranding even though the product and the
labeling information were shipped separately. "The fact that [the brochures] went in a
different mail was wholly irrelevant.")
130 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998); 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (1997).
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Likewise, although the FDCA does not define advertising per
se, the regulations hold that all descriptive matter "issued or caused
to be issued by the manufacturer, packer or distributor" are subject
to the provisions of the FDCA, including advertisements in
published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers,
and advertisements broadcast through media, such as radio,
television, and telephone communication systems.'
3 1
In sum, the FDA regulates virtually any dissemination of
information about a pharmaceutical product. It has effectively
crafted a self-described "seamless regulatory regime" in which
drug products cannot be marketed or promoted to anyone, for any
use, in the absence of labeling for the FDA-approved use. 132 Some
have criticized this regulatory zeal as emboldening a ubiquitous
national regulatory agency that has near limitless control over the
drug industry. 133 Nonetheless, the FDA's broad construction of
labeling and advertising, and as a consequence, off-label drug
promotion, has unquestionably become one of the hallmarks of
FDA regulation.
C. FDA Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion
A substantial part of a drug's market share can be derived from
sales for off-label uses.1 34 Off-label uses have the benefit that they
are not approved by the FDA and therefore do not occasion all of
the costs and delays associated with the approval process itself.
Despite this lack of a need for pre-marketing approval, off-label
31 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (1997).
132 Thomas A. Hayes, Drug Labeling and Promotion: Evolution and Application of
Regulatory Policy, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 57, 62 (1996).
133 See Henry I. Miller, Failed FDA Reform, 21 REG. 24 (1998); see also David A.
Kessler & Wayne L. Pines, The Federal Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising and
Promotion, 264 JAMA 2409, 2410 (1990) ("The definitions of labeling and advertising
taken together cover-at least in the FDA's opinion-virtually all information-
disseminating activities by or on behalf of a prescription drug manufacturer.").
134 See David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians,
166 ARCH INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006) (reporting that in an estimated sample of
725 million drug treatments, a total of 150 million [21%] were being used for off-label
indications, while off-label treatments comprised up to 83% of an individual drug's use);
see also Jane Henney, Safeguarding Patient Welfare: Who's in Charge? 145 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 305, 305 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full!145/4/305.
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indications are still tightly regulated in terms of how they may be
marketed and promoted. For example, any inclusion of a non-FDA
approved indication on a drug product's labeling renders that
product adulterated and any promotion of an off-label indication
renders the product misbranded. 135 Manufacturing or introducing
any such adulterated or misbranded product into interstate
commerce is prohibited. 136  Thus, any promotional labeling,
advertising, or distribution of a drug for an off-label use by the
drug manufacturer is deemed a false or misleading representation
that violates the FDCA and the corresponding FDA regulations. In
this way, the FDA has retained exclusive control over the drug
product's labeling and promotion and, by extension, drug profits,
including those from off-label sales.' 
37
Not surprisingly, the FDA's regulation of labeling and off-label
marketing has become a popular target for proponents of
deregulation. 138 Pharmaceutical companies lament the additional
costs in time and money involved in compliance with FDA drug
labeling regulations and in obtaining supplemental approvals for
new and often very important indications. Physicians carp about
FDA restrictions on their reading materials, continuing medical
education, and general scientific exchanges.' 39 Many believe that
off-label promotion to physicians should be largely unrestricted,
given physicians' general familiarity with the FDA-approval
process and ability to independently evaluate the validity of a drug
13' 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(f)(1)(B), 352(a) (2000) (stating that a drug "shall be deemed to be
misbranded . . . if its labeling is false or misleading" and a label "shall not be considered
to be false or misleading ... if the health care economic information directly relates to an
indication approved.., for such drug"); 21 C.F.R. § 201(6) (1976). This misbranding
concept harkens back to the 1912 Sherley Amendment. There, false and misleading
claims of therapeutic effect were prohibited. See supra note 20. The Drug Efficacy
Amendments, on the other hand, broadened the definition of misbranding to encompass
anything other than an approved use.
136 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(c), (g) (2004).
137 The only way a drug manufacturer can legally promote a new use for an approved
drug product is to request FDA permission to conduct another series of clinical trials and
file SNDAs for the unapproved use and await subsequent approval before modifying their
drug labels to include the new use. See supra Part I. E.; see also Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
138 See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 17, at 887.
139 See Henney, supra note 134.
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manufacturer's claims. 14  Indeed, as noted by Third Circuit Judge
Cowen, "[o]nce it is accepted that off-label uses are desirable, it is
difficult to maintain that doctors should be shielded from truthful
information concerning when and how to use a product for an off-
label use. Patients will benefit from having their doctors informed
about off-label use."
' 14 1
The pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession each
believe that the FDA's costly and time-consuming processes for
validating and amending drug labeling claims impinge upon their
freedoms and prevent them from keeping pace with rapidly
evolving medical advances. Indeed, in its efforts to implement a
regulatory system that protects the public health, the heavy hand of
the FDA comes down hard on the physicians' freedom to practice
medicine and the drug manufacturers' freedom of speech with
regard to their drug products. As a result, regulatory efforts to
restrict the promotion of off-label drug uses have generally served
to ally pharmaceutical companies and physicians against the FDA.
D. Balancing Physician Autonomy, Pharmaceutical Innovation
and Public Health
The FDA has no jurisdiction over physicians and has
consistently maintained that it does not intend to interfere with the
practice of medicine. The FDA recognizes that there are important
uses of drugs that are not on the label and that once a product is
approved for marketing for a specific use, the FDA does not
regulate how, or for what uses, physicians may prescribe that
drug. 142  Indeed, the FDA has affirmed that, in certain
circumstances, off-label uses of approved products are appropriate,
rational, and accepted medical practice. 143  The FDA's labeling
140 See United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N. D. Il1. 2003) (noting that
the sophistication of the audience to whom off-label uses are promoted should be taken
into account when evaluating the legitimacy of such promotion).
141 In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 830-31 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Cowen, J., dissenting), rev'd, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341
(2001).
142 See supra note 7.
143 See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820 (Nov. 18, 1994) (citing FDA Drug Bulletin 12:4-5, 1982);
see also Supplemental Indications for Approved Prescription Drugs: Before the H.
Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, Subcomm. on Human Resources and
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restrictions are not intended either to preclude a physician from
using her best judgment in the interest of the patient, or to impose
liability if she does not follow the package insert.144  The true
controversy emerges between what a drug manufacturer could
lawfully claim that a drug does and for what condition or to which
patient a physician may prescribe a drug. 14
5
This controversy came to a head in the late 1980's, when
pharmaceutical manufacturers aggressively increased their support
for Continuing Medical Education (CME) seminars for physicians.
Several educational reports were published documenting the
effects of industry sponsorship on changes in drug prescribing
patterns and concerns began to emerge in the medical community
about the bias inherent in the sponsored CME seminars and
commercial company funding to physicians. 146  In response to
assorted lobbying efforts, Congress conducted hearings in 1990 to
investigate the impact of commercial pharmaceutical funding on
physicians' prescribing behavior. It determined that, in addition to
promoting "on-label" uses, the seminars were also regularly being
used to promote unapproved uses for approved drug products.147
In the face of these educational practices, which-for approved
uses-were acknowledged as being helpful to physicians, the FDA
reasserted that pharmaceutical manufacturers could not promote or
suggest in any way off-label uses for their products. Physicians
generally looked askance at the FDA's iron fist on this issue,
Intergovernmental Relations, 104th Cong. 57-77 (1996) (statement of Michael Friedman,
Deputy Comm'r for Operations, FDA). Transcript of testimony available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960912a.html.
144 Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 37
Fed. Reg. 16503, 16504 (Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, July 30, 1972). Note that
liability may attach against physicians based on state tort laws, which recognize labeling
as a factor to consider in determining the standard of care. See discussion infra notes
195-202 and accompanying text.
145 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
146 See, e.g., Bowman & Pearle, supra note 118 (discussing the potential mechanisms of
a self-reported increase in the prescribing rates of the sponsoring drug company's
calcium channel and beta blocker drug products by physicians who attended CME
courses on related topics).
147 See Advertising, Marketing and Promotional Practices of the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 1990; Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 101 st Cong. 2,
5, 8-13 (1990).
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preferring the open dissemination of information concerning all
beneficial uses for approved drug products. 48 Given the obvious
financial interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers to encourage
off-label uses of their drugs, however, the FDA deemed it
necessary to issue detailed guidance to clarify permissible practices
by manufacturers. Three such Guidance Documents addressed
restrictions on promotion of off-label uses and industry-supported
CME programs. 149  The FDA promulgated the Guidance
Documents in "recognition of the generally accepted practice of
off-label prescription of drugs, as well as the need for full
exchange of scientific views, including discussions of unapproved
uses."
150
The FDA's stated goal was to deter pharmaceutical companies
from promoting their own products through unregulated avenues,
e.g., by distributing textbooks and medical journal articles to
healthcare professionals that referred to off-label uses. To do this,
the FDA broadened the definition of a "promotional relationship"
to include virtually any healthcare communication between
individuals in the drug industry and healthcare professionals
concerning a drug's effectiveness and use. 15' Little distinction was
made between practices of pharmaceutical manufacturers that
attempted to circumvent FDA regulations and influence off-label
markets and those that attempted to simply respond to physicians'
demand for scientific information about off-label uses. In point of
148 As noted by one law professor, the practical import of the FDA's stance was
debatable. On the one hand, pharmaceutical manufacturers had the resources and
incentives to sponsor valuable drug education, so that individual physicians would not
have to rely exclusively on their own experience in making prescribing decisions. On the
other hand, the manufacturers undeniably expected a return on their investment. See
Noah, supra note 44, at 406-07.
149 See Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published,
Original Data and Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts, 61
Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996); Guidance on Industry: Industry-Supported Scientific and
Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) (updating the original draft
publications at 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (1992)).
150 Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on Dissemination of
Information on Off-Label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 648 (1999).
151 See 62 Fed. Reg. 64,080 (Dec. 3, 1997) (explaining that all industry-supported
materials and activities should be free from the promotional influence of the supporting
company).
[Vol. 18
A CENTURY OF FDA REGULATION
fact, both practices could occur through the nontraditional forms of
information exchange, e.g., chats over coffee, that transpire in
scientific and educational activities and meetings. In efforts to
demarcate the boundaries in these grey zones, the FDA gave itself
the authority to police the fine line between permissible and
impermissible communications about off-label use.152  By most
industry accounts, these Guidance Documents pushed the
regulatory envelope.'
53
E. Judicial Invalidation of FDA Restrictions on Commercial
Speech
In the early 1990's an industry-supported nonprofit
organization named the Washington Legal Fund (WLF), filed a
citizen's petition challenging the FDA's restrictions on the
promotion of off-label uses for approved drugs through
dissemination of article reprints and sponsorship of CME
programs. 154 When the FDA denied the petition, the WLF turned
to the district court for the District of Columbia, claiming that the
FDA prohibitions violated the First Amendment rights of drug
manufacturers to distribute information about off-label uses and
physicians to receive the same. 55 A series of court cases over the
next few years addressed the issue of whether the FDA had
unconstitutionally interfered with drug manufacturers and
physicians' First Amendment freedom in speech to communicate
information about the off-label uses of drug products.
The WLF argued that the unobstructed dissemination of
scientific and medical information concerning off-label treatments
should be allowed, inter alia, because of the physicians' need to
152 See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 830-31 (3d Cir.
1998) (Cowen, J., dissenting), rev'd, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341 (2001).
153 See Miller, supra note 133, at 26.
154 Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion
of Unapproved Drugs and Devices: Request for Comments, 59 Fed. Reg. 59820 (Nov.
18, 1994).
155 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. First Amendment protections extend both to
distribution and receipt of commercial speech. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13
F. Supp. 2d 51, 62-65 (D.D.C. 1998).
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obtain reliable information about the products they prescribe.' 56
The argument evolved into a general criticism of the FDA's
practice of penalizing the pharmaceutical manufacturer as the
source of the information, i.e., the "speaker" of the speech under
First Amendment law. The bottom line of the argument was that
because the dissemination or exchange of legitimate scientific
information from or between independent sources was
constitutionally sanctioned, the FDA should not be permitted to
restrict the flow of such information merely because it came from a
drug manufacturer.
157
Throughout the litigations, the FDA maintained that its
approach to regulating product information was inherently
congruent with its mission to promote health and safety. The FDA
acknowledged that its policies prevented manufacturers from
financing CME seminars and from distributing reprints of peer-
reviewed journal articles that addressed off-label uses. The FDA
advanced two specific interests in support of its restrictions. First,
the FDA claimed it had the duty to ensure that physicians receive
accurate and unbiased information so that they can make informed
prescribing choices. Second, the FDA claimed it had the duty to
provide pharmaceutical manufacturers with ample incentive to
apply for and get new uses approved "on label," by filing
SNDAs. 158
The D.C. Court concluded that the FDA's first interest was
inadequate to justify its intrusion on free speech but the second
interest was substantial. 59 On the whole, the court held the FDA
policies more extensive than necessary to serve the government's
interests and held the Guidance Documents to be an
156 Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
157 Id. at 68 (observing that claims are not inherently misleading merely because they
were neither made by scientists or academics nor evaluated by the FDA). See also Wash.
Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Even under the degree of scrutiny that we have applied in commercial
speech cases, decisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical
messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amendment.")
(citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 194 (1999)).
158 Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
151 Id. at 71.
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unconstitutional infringement of commercial speech. 160  In so
holding, the court maintained a clear distinction between claims
advanced by a manufacturer to promote its product (not allowed)
and scientific conclusions published in a peer-reviewed journal or
presented by a physician at a CME seminar (allowed). 16 1  The
court enjoined the FDA from applying or enforcing its Guidance
Documents and dryly observed that the FDA should not feel
responsible for ensuring that all scientific publications are unbiased
and non-misleading. 
162
Against the backdrop of the court mandate, the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 ("FDAMA") was
passed.163 The FDAMA provided a revised framework for limited
FDA supervision of the production and dissemination of select
materials concerning off-label drug use to physicians and other
members of the healthcare by or on behalf of drug manufacturers.
In notable distinction from the earlier Guidance Documents, the
statute permitted the dissemination so-called "enduring materials,"
i.e., unedited reprints or copies of peer-reviewed scientific or
medical journal publications, as long as the drug manufacturer had
satisfied certain criteria, including having filed an SNDA on the
new indication; having directly sponsored the trials; having filed
the report intended for distribution with the FDA in advance; and
having the reports bear the disclaimer that the new use had not
been approved by the FDA.164
Based on this new law, the FDA asked the district court to
explicitly confine its earlier injunction to the pre-FDAMA
Guidance Documents. This motion was denied in Washington
160 Id. at 74.
161 Id. at 67.
162 Id. ("In asserting that any and all scientific claims about the safety, effectiveness,
contraindications, side effects, and the like regarding prescription drugs are
presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate
them, FDA exaggerates its overall place in the universe.").
163 The Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
(1997).
'64 See 21 U.S.C. § 55 1(b) (2005). The statute also directly addressed some physician
concerns by stating that no provision barred a manufacturer from disseminating
information in response to an unsolicited request from a healthcare practitioner. See id. §
557(a).
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Legal Foundation v. Friedman 16  and a subsequent opinion
declared the FDAMA provisions unconstitutional.1
66
The latter decision was appealed and ultimately vacated by
Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney,16 7 however, based on the
FDA's novel interpretation of the FDAMA provisions and the
1997 Guidance Document. For the first time, at the appellate oral
argument, the FDA recognized that a "safe harbor" existed for
industry-supported scientific and educational activities and
qualifying CME programs.' 6 8 This late-breaking safe harbor from
the FDA regulation space was unsupported by the statutory
language in the FDAMA or elsewhere. Nonetheless, the FDA
effectively represented to the court it would not use obvious
violations of the FDAMA or the Guidelines to prosecute drug
manufacturers exercising their First Amendment rights.1 69  As a
result, the D.C. Court dismissed the appeal for the technical lack of
a constitutional controversy, all the while noting that it did not
criticize the reasoning or conclusions of the district court. 170 The
peculiar set of facts surrounding the appeal undoubtedly reflected
the mounting pressure by various interest groups on the FDA to
recognize the educational need to disseminate reliable scientific
information on off-label uses.
As might have been expected, any lasting practical utility of
the FDA-created safe harbor is questionable. The boundaries on
commercial speech concerning drug information continue to
expand and contract as the FDA struggles to formulate restrictions
that will not conflict with constitutional freedoms yet will effect its
perceived mandate of regulating off-label uses. 17 1 At present, a
165 36 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
166 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999).
167 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
168 Henney, 202 F.3d at 335. The FDA interpreted the guidelines on disseminating
information on new uses, found in § 401 of the FDAMA, as forming the implied basis for
a safe harbor. Id.
169 The FDA assured the court that certain forms of conduct "would not be used against
manufacturers in misbranding and 'intended use' enforcement actions based on pre-
existing legislative authority." Id. But cf, infra Part III: Manufacturer Liability Resulting
from Off-Label Use (discussion of current-day enforcement actions).
170 Henney, 202 F.3d at 337.
171 First Amendment case law is controlling, and virtually no mention has been made in
the courts of the FDA's safe harbor. See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
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drug manufacturer can disseminate information concerning off-
label drug use that appears in independent and peer-reviewed
sources to members of the healthcare community.' 72  Solid
guidance, however, is still lacking on the promotional restrictions
for materials that are openly distributed by drug manufacturers to
the public at large. The FDA is likely to view materials that are
broadly "consumed" by the public as advertising and subject to
strict regulation by the FDCA. Indeed, a tenuous distinction exists
between the promotional practices of pharmaceutical
manufacturers that attempt to circumvent FDA regulations and
influence off-label prescribing of medications and those practices
that attempt to educate physicians and to exchange scientific
information in an unbiased manner. Like a teeter-totter, as FDA
regulations on drug promotion and information dissemination of
off-label uses fall, concerted regulatory attempts to monitor drug
safety will inevitably rise.173
The legality of off-label drug promotion is one that has
frequently tested the judiciary's ability to provide appropriate
boundaries for the exercise of FDA regulatory power, for the good
of the consumer, the physician and the drug manufacturer. The
final Part of this Note examines the various policy considerations
357 (U.S. 2002) (holding FDA restrictions on pharmacist promotion of individually
mixed "compounded" drugs an unconstitutional violation of commercial speech). Cf
Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69150 at *35
(D.N.J. June 23, 2006) (failing to consider a safe harbor which exempts certain drug
correspondence from regulation as promotional communications because it is not
supported by any statute or cited any regulation promulgated by the FDA).
72 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a) (2002) provides a "scientific exchange" exception to drug
marketing activities at, stating that promotional restrictions are not intended to impede
the "full exchange of scientific information concerning the drug, including dissemination
of scientific findings in scientific or lay media." This exception has led to a general
practice among pharmaceutical manufacturers of separating sales personnel from
"scientific exchange" personnel.
173 Recently, some pharmaceutical manufacturers have responded by shifting their
company resources away from sales and towards increased drug research and safety
monitoring. Pfizer, for example, has undergone significant restructuring that involved
laying off 20% of their sales force in the U.S., due in part to doctor complaints of being
overrun by too many sales representatives. See Alex Berenson, New Chief at Pfizer Will
Reduce Sales Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/business/29pfizer.html?ref=-business. Compare this
trend with recent legislative proposals to increase drug safety, infra Part Ill: Proposals for
FDA Reform.
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surrounding the safe harbor under which physicians and
pharmaceutical manufacturers can operate to develop and
distribute drugs and provide advanced, state of the art medical
care.
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: CAN THE FDA CATCH UP TO THE
FUTURE?
Because the FDA has responsibility in matters
which directly and literally affect the nation's health
and welfare, it is one of the most important of all
Federal regulatory agencies. Its enforcement stance
must be well balanced, but nevertheless effective.
A timid approach can vitiate whatever protection
the Congress has created for the consumer. On the
other hand, an overly zealous approach can ruin a
drug manufacturer by destroying public confidence
in its products. 1
74
As with any deregulated activity, off-label decision-making is
inherently vulnerable to unethical practices, by pharmaceutical
manufacturers and others. From a physician's perspective, medical
ethics control medical practice. From a drug industry perspective,
legal and corporate ethics control behavior. For everyone, these
professional ethics are often seen as a constraint, like the law. 175
While all ethics are ultimately justified by morality, professional
ethics are often constrained by rules promulgated by a regulatory
agency, such as the FDA. Ideally, this regulatory body is tailored
to take into account, in its rulemaking, facts about the institutions
involved and their respective roles in the industry. 76  The
challenge for most regulatory bodies is to engineer and effectuate
an acceptable balance between the interests of consumers and
various stakeholders. In the FDA's case, the goals and interests of
the parties involved in the healthcare industry are often at odds.
174 American Public Health Ass'n. v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1317 (D.D.C. 1972).
175 See Jonathan Baron, Do No Harm, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, 197-213 (D. M. Messick & A. E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1997)
available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-baron/chicago.html.
176 Id. at 197 n.2.
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Patients, physicians and drug manufacturers all want to benefit
from having improved drug access and availability, but they also
all want to know and expect the drugs to be safe and effective.
The FDA has the obligation to try and balance these potentially
incompatible goals, while minimizing the industry costs of
compliance. 1
77
A. The Double-Edged Sword of Drug Regulation
As was illustrated by the complexity of the WLF litigations,
difficult and subtle balancing is called for in evaluating the FDA's
role in regulating the promotion and practice of off-label drug use.
Striking a proper regulatory balance between competing principles
in this arena is a constant tension that becomes intensified when
the players engage in diverging practices, to accomplish the same
end goal of achieving public health and safety. The path to this
goal intrinsically affects the outcome and each step carries the
potential for both large profits and large losses. For example, a
blanket prohibition on off-label drug promotion, intended to
safeguard the public from unsafe and ineffective drugs, could in
operation have a directly negative impact on public health. While
a drug approved for one use is undergoing the FDA's stringent and
time consuming review for safety and effectiveness for another
use, it cannot be promoted for that new use and patients who might
have received some health benefit from it suffer.
78
In such instances, the physician's interest and duty to treat his
or her patient should supplant the government's interest in
safeguarding individual patient welfare by allowing only approved
drugs and uses to be marketed. This is particularly true because
the FDA has already approved the drug as safe for all uses.
Accordingly, the physician should be able to exercise his or her
177 See Gardiner Harris, Potentially Incompatible Goals at F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/1I/washington/ I Ifda.html
(observing that "[s]afety and speed are the yin and yang of drug regulation").
178 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate
Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 B.U. L. REV.
93 (1999) (generally discussing how the FDA should adopt an under-conservative
approach towards drug approvals for new uses in AIDS treatments because of the
immediate social need for life-saving treatment options).
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professional autonomy to prescribe a drug for uses, or in
treatments, regimens, or patient populations, that are not listed on
the FDA-approved label but may nonetheless prove effective for
that prescribed purpose. The physician rationale for supporting
off-label use is frequently one of sheer necessity-some patients
need the treatment option even if there does not yet exist enough
data to demonstrate clinical effectiveness and support FDA
approval for the use. 179 As the Supreme Court has pragmatically
observed, the "off-label usage of [drugs and medical devices] is an
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate
in this area without directly interfering with the practice of
medicine."'1
80
From a pharmaceutical industry perspective, however, once a
drug is approved for a first use, off-label sales expand, sometimes
by many multiples.181 This market fact encourages manufacturers
to seek FDA approval only for the narrowest, most easy to support
indications and then reap the benefits of off-label sales. The
existing market for the drug, both on and off-label, necessarily
dampens the incentives of drug manufacturers to invest the
substantial time and resources necessary to conduct further trials
and to develop the evidence required for FDA approval of
additional uses. This marketplace deterrent is further reinforced by
the Supreme Court's holding that the FDA's approval requirement
is not subject to exception based on the difficulty or cost of
obtaining approval or of the conceded benefits of the unapproved
uses.
182
Early entry of generic competition also makes the
pharmaceutical manufacturer much less likely to seek approval for
the new use. Once a generic enters the market for a first use, it
will be prescribed for all uses--on or off label. State substitution
179 Id. at 97-98. See also Henney, supra note 134, at 305; Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding
Awkward Alchemy-In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected
Independent Research Should not Transmogrify Into Mere Commercial Speech Just
Because Product Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 971 (1999)
(explaining that off-label prescribing is particularly important in certain specialties, such
as cancer treatment and pediatric medicine).
180 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
181 See Radley, supra note 134, at 1023-24 (Tables 1 and 2).
182 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1979).
Vol. 18
A CENTURY OF FDA REGULATION
laws generally require physicians to prescribe, and pharmacists to
distribute, any available generic version of a drug, for all approved
and unapproved uses for which it is prescribed.1 83 Many of these
state substitution laws also preclude medical insurers from
declining to reimburse for generics prescribed off-label solely
because they are unapproved for such indications.' 
84
In addition, Federal Medicare coverage policies now include,
as eligible for coverage, those off-label uses that are deemed
medically acceptable. 85  At least one court has also recently
supported Medicaid reimbursement claims for certain off-label
uses of approved medications that were deemed medically
accepted indications.' 86 Were a drug manufacturer to have
invested in obtaining an SNDA for a new use, the market for that
use would already have been viable for coverage when generic
entry began. Because the same situation applies if the
manufacturer did not obtain approval for the new use, there is little
reason to do it. In sum, off-label uses are highly profitable for
pharmaceutical manufacturers prior to generic entry, and are
highly profitable for generic drug manufacturers thereafter.
183 See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6810(6)(a) (2002) (requiring all prescriptions to include
the language that "this prescription will be filled generically" unless certain limited
exemptions apply to allow it to be dispensed as written).
184 Local coverage determinations are made by the relevant state authorities. See, e.g.,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-2352(a)(6)-(7), (c)(1), cited in Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.w.3d
1, 14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
185 For example, coverage is available for the off-label uses of drugs in numerous
anticancer chemotherapeutic regimens. See, e.g., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services: Off-Label Use of Colorectal Cancer Drugs Allowed in Select Clinical Trials, 1
J. ONCOLOGY PRACTICE 12-14 (2005). All national coverage determinations are made by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). See also Social Security Act, §
1861(t)(1); Medicare Benefit Policy Manual (CMS Pub. 100-2), Chap. 15, § 50.4.2
(defining medically acceptable as being supported by certain compendia and authoritative
medical literature and/or accepted standards of medical practice). See generally CMS
Medicare Coverage Database, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/indexes.asp (last visited
Sept. 12, 2007).
186 See Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1343 (D. Fla. 2006) (overruling a
state policy that denied reimbursements under Medicaid for off-label uses of
Neurontin®). But cf, United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39,
51-53 (D. Mass. 2001); supra text accompanying notes 214-218 (discussing Parke-Davis
liability under False Claims Act for causing the submission of fraudulent claims to the
government for off-label uses of Neurontin® that were ineligible for reimbursement
under Medicaid).
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The problem that emerges is the ensuing dearth of scientific
evidence of efficacy available for physicians to assess and evaluate
off-label treatments. 187 Pharmaceutical companies are
insufficiently motivated to invest in detailed and controlled
supplementary clinical research if off-label uses are already
profitable and the costs associated with the development and
licensure to get such uses formally approved may not be
recoverable, because of generic drug entry. Branded
pharmaceutical manufacturers have tried recovering their lost
market share from generic drug manufacturers by suing the generic
manufacturers for inducing patent infringement of the branded
company's patented new uses for the drug. 188  However, courts
have held that pharmaceutical companies as "new use" patent
holders cannot sue a generic drug maker for inducing infringement
if the patented use is off-label, i.e., not FDA approved. 18  Under
this jurisprudence, incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers to
further develop drugs that have generic competition (i.e., drugs that
are off-patent or near off-patent) are thoroughly dismantled.'90
Despite the good intentions of the FDA to regulate drug
labeling and off-label drug promotion, therefore, it seems clear that
any administrative policy will necessarily have some reverberating
negative effects on modem medical practice. Overbroad
187 See Henney, supra note 134, at 305-07.
188 In such cases, pharmaceutical manufacturers have argued that generics should not be
allowed to obtain FDA approval on one use and then benefit from the state laws that
substitute generic drugs for all indications for which the brand name drug is used,
including methods of using the drug that are patented by the branded pharmaceutical
manufacturer. The pharmaceutical manufacturers lost. See Warner-Lambert Co. v.
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1354-62 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs.,
324 F.3d 1322, 1330-34 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8602 (Dec. 1,
2003).
189 This is so even if the generic manufacturer is aware of the future probability of
crossover prescriptions and sales of their drug for the off-label uses. Warner-Lambert Co.
v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d at 1355, 1365 (evidence of a generic company's reliance on
financial projections that demonstrate its drug will be prescribed in a manner that would
infringe a method patent is insufficient to show the generic manufacturer encouraged or
promoted doctors to prescribe the drug in that manner). Accord Allergan, 324 F.3d at
1334.
190 For a further discussion of the issues, see Rebecca Eisenberg, Pharmaceutical
Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 717 (2005).
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restrictions can unduly hamper physicians' freedoms to learn about
and make personal medical judgments and drug manufacturers'
rights to discuss their products with the medical community. On
the other hand, unfettered practices may remove incentives to
support the development of real, controlled data on the efficacy of
drugs for new indications. Absent adequate incentives for drug
manufacturers to generate and disseminate information about the
range of available therapeutics to health care professionals,
physicians risk, in turn, making determinations about the relative
safety and effectiveness of their treatment options that is wide of
the mark. The double-edged sword of drug regulation can cut
deeply both ways.
Good decisions are made with as much data as possible. Good
healthcare decisions likewise should be made with as much data on
the use of drugs for non-approved indications as possible. The
FDA requires the data to safeguard the public, the physician wants
the comfort of the data when prescribing drugs and the
manufacturer wants to be able to truly market the data and profit
from the drug's new indication for a substantial enough period of
time to recoup the costs of testing and to earn a profit. The time
taken for the FDA's regulatory machinery to approve new
indications plainly lags behind the state-of-the-art medical practice.
At the same time, the undesirable promotion of unevaluated or
under evaluated off-label indications is costly to the
pharmaceutical manufacturer and to the healthcare system as a
whole. On some level, the drug industry needs the FDA's
regulatory framework as much as the FDA needs the drug industry
to adhere to it. But where does this leave the physician?
B. Medical Liability Resulting From Off-Label Use
The FDA makes clear that it does not regulate the practice of
medicine and that physicians will not be held liable, under the
FDCA, for damage caused by a drug used off-label. 191 Physicians
are by no means exempt from the risk of liability arising from off-
label prescribing, however. The fear of liability arising under state
tort law, including products liability and medical malpractice laws,
191 See supra note 7.
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generally serves to keep physicians' off-label prescribing practices
in check.
In the case of products liability law, if a patient is injured by a
drug product and files a claim against the drug manufacturer and
the prescribing physician, the "learned intermediary doctrine" can
affect the apportionment of liability between the defendants. This
doctrine is based on the presumption that physicians, as learned
intermediaries between drug manufacturers and patients, are
responsible for warning patients of the potential hazards and
defects associated with prescribed medications. 192  The drug
manufacturer is excused, therefore, from warning each patient who
receives the product so long as the manufacturer properly warns
the prescribing physician of the product's dangers.' 9
3
Drug manufacturers typically use the learned intermediary
doctrine as an affirmative defense against liability, thereby shifting
blame for the patient's injuries to the prescribing physician. The
determination of liability under this doctrine generally hinges on
the whether the risk of harm was foreseeable by the manufacturer
(unforeseeability of the off-label use or non-conveyance of the
physician's warning to the patient limits the manufacturer's
liability) or whether the off-label use is the known standard of care
in the medical community (common usage by the profession limits
the physician's liability). Thus, while physicians are not required
to disclose to patients that a drug is being prescribed for off-label
use, most physicians make efforts to limit their liability by doing
so.
While the learned intermediary doctrine can technically be
invoked each time a prescription is written, the practical strength
of the doctrine may have diminished over the years, as physicians
tend to stand less as intermediaries between their patients and drug
192 The roots of the doctrine originated in Marcus v. Specific Pharms. Inc., 77 N.Y.S.2d
508, 509-10 (N.Y. App. Term. 1948).
193 See Crisostomo v. Stanley, 857 F.2d 1146, 1152 n.17 (7th Cir. 1988); accord Kirk v.
Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 513 N.E.2d 387, 390 (111. 1987) (explaining how
drug manufacturers typically communicate warnings relating to prescription drugs to the
medical profession through package inserts, the Physician's Desk Reference, "Dear
Doctor" letters, detailing, and other measures)
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manufacturers. 194 In cases of off-label prescribing, manufacturers
have attempted to benefit from the doctrine's protection by
claiming that the absence of appropriate labeling constituted a
sufficient warning against a drug's off-label use. This defense has
met with limited success, as DTC advertising tends to undercut the
rationale behind the doctrine.195 Some courts have reasoned that
because drug manufacturers generate a sense of product quality
through mass advertising and marketing practices, they are
reasonably subject to the common law duty to warn to the
consumer. 196 However, the majority of states continue to uphold
that the learned intermediary doctrine, on the general reasoning
that the physician is still in the best position to evaluate the
warnings put out by drug manufacturers.'
97
194 Shortly after DTC advertising was introduced, several courts rejected the learned
intermediary doctrine in cases involving oral contraceptives. Each court reasoned that
consumers of oral contraceptives actively choose to take the drug and prescribing
physicians play relatively passive roles, therefore the doctrine does not apply and drug
manufacturers must provide adequate warnings to consumers directly. See Odgers v.
Ortho Pharms. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharms, 475 N.E.2d 65,
cert. denied 474 U.S. 920 (1985); see also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th
Cir. 1989) (extending the exception to other forms of birth control [prescription intra-
uterine devices (IUD)] where prescribing physicians did not make an intervening,
individualized medical judgment in the decision). Note that not all courts have adopted
such exceptions, however. See, e.g., Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978
(Wash. 1978); Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356-57 (Ill.
1996); In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Litg., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999).
195 Indeed, the duty for pharmaceutical manufacturers to warn the patient directly is
supported by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(c)-(d) (1998).
196 See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255-57 (N.J. 1999) (rejecting
the doctrine and holding the manufacturer liable for consumer claims if its advertisements
failed to provide adequate warnings); W. Va. ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp v.
Honorable Mark A. Karl, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 57, at *51-53 (W. Va. June 27,2007)
(rejecting doctrine and holding that drug manufacturers have the same duty to warn
consumers about the risks of their products as other manufacturers).
197 These courts still require that proper warnings be given to the physician, of course.
See, e.g., Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Ky. 2004) ("The entire system of
drug distribution in America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and
use upon professional people."); accord McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 587 S.E.2d 594,
595 (Ga. 2003); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 836-38 (Conn. 2001); Pittman v.
Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1994); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584
A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. 1991); White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ohio
1988).
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Off-label prescribing could also constitute medical malpractice
under state law, if such prescribing was not customarily followed
by physicians. In order for a medical malpractice claim to succeed
on these grounds, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a
direct physician-patient relationship and that the physician
significantly departed from the standard of care of a reasonable
physician. 198  Because the former is generally much easier to
prove, most litigations hinge on whether the physician's
prescription of the drug for an off-label use was warranted, i.e.,
whether it was based on sound scientific evidence and sound
medical opinion. 99
Whereas courts once held doctors to a standard of care based
loosely on custom among local practitioners, nowadays the
standard is more stringent.20 0  Peer-reviewed medical journals are
generally considered the only reliable source of sound scientific
and medical opinion, as introduced by expert testimony or as a
learned treatise. 20 1 Some courts have held the off-label nature ofthe prescription itself is a factor to be considered in establishing
198 Common law negligence principles dictate that a plaintiff must establish that a duty
of care arose from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the
defendant breached his or her duty by failing to comply with the reasonable person
standard. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 193-95 (Foundation Press, 10th ed. 2000) (1951).
199 Jacqueline M. Melonas, Preventing and Reducing Professional Liability Risk Related
to Psychopharmacology, 23 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleld=l 75803689; see also
McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a
physician-patient relationship broadly arises out of a contract of employment, express or
implied, where a patient seeks medical assistance and a physician agrees to render
treatment).
200 The old custom was also based on the locality of the physician, assuming that rural
customs would differ from customs in state-of-the-art urban medical centers. This
community practice distinction has largely been dropped in favor of a national standard
of care. See, e.g., Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968) ("The time has
come when the medical profession should no longer be Balkanized by the application of
varying geographic standards in malpractice cases."), cited in Noah, supra note 44, at 457
n.376.
201 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide for a "learned treatise" hearsay exception to
allow a textbook or journal article to speak for itself in court if it is recognized to be a
reliable authority (as established by expert testimony or judicial notice). See FED. R.
EVID. 803(18).
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the reasonable standard of care (or a deviation therefrom).20 2
Ultimately, expert testimony will be required to establish whether a
specific off-label treatment demonstrates a lack of skill or
knowledge, or a failure to exercise reasonable care, on behalf of
the physician.
20 3
Increasingly, and in spite of the many land mines surrounding
the practice, many courts have recognized the legitimacy of off-
label prescribing when it constitutes the standard of reasonable
care. 204  Even with this judicial recognition, however, many
physicians remain uncomfortable with the liability risk that
surrounds off-label prescribing. 20 5  While it is always true that
physicians must take steps to educate themselves about how to
diagnose and treat new and evolving medical conditions, the
burden of self-education increases with regard to learning about
unapproved uses for approved drugs. Because of FDA restrictions
on manufacturer-sponsored physician education about off-label
uses, medical professionals do not always have ready access to the
necessary information about the customary use of drugs prescribed
off-label. This lack of information makes it more difficult for a
prescribing physician to assess how their peers would act in
treating patients. Understandably, physicians have shown tepid
support for FDA regulations that cabin their ability to assess their
202 In Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), the court held the
exclusion of off-label use evidence to be an error of law that hampered the patient
plaintiffs ability to prove her malpractice and products liability claims. In so holding,
the court noted that while proof of a departure from the drug's labeling will not ipsofacto
prove a breach of the standard of care, the labeling can provide significant assistance in
identifying the standard of care.
203 Id; see also Halligan v. Cotton, 227 N.W.2d 10, 12-13 (Neb. 1975) ("[Wjhether a
specific manner of treatment or exercise of skill by a physician or surgeon demonstrates a
lack of skill or knowledge or a failure to exercise reasonable care is a matter that must
usually be proved by expert testimony.")
204 See, e.g., Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Femrite v.
Abbott Northwestern Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Alvarez v.
Smith, 714 So. 2d 652, 653-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Southard v. Temple Univ.
Hosp., 731 A.2d 603, 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
205 See, e.g., Richardson, 44 S.W. 3d at 10-13 (observing that physicians who prescribe
off-label have a responsibility to be well-informed about the drug and, in the absence of
the information found in the FDA-approved labeling, physicians bear the additional
burden of obtaining reliable, up-to-date information from other sources).
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own risk of professional liability for choosing to prescribe drugs
off-label.2" 6
C. Manufacturer Liability Resulting From Off-Label Use
Where there's money, there's action. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers can be subject to both civil and criminal liability,
under both state and federal law, where a cornucopia of claims can
be brought by the public sector, private sector interest groups,
private citizens on behalf of the government, or private citizens as
individuals, for alleged damage caused by off-label drug use.
Efforts to manage the liability risks arising from the promotion of
off-label uses for a drug product by its manufacturer is akin to
herding cats.
To begin somewhere, products liability law can serve to inform
a drug manufacturer about the proper (and improper) practices of
drug labeling and promotion. A patient's product liability claim
against a drug manufacturer will be subject to strict liability in
cases where the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply. As
explained in the foregoing section, strict liability may apply when
mass advertising and DTC marketing practices are involved, when
little physician input is needed to make the medical decision, or
when the drug manufacturer has given inadequate warnings to the
207 A scprescribing physician. Under such circumstances, a patient will
likely recover if he or she can demonstrate that the drug was
unreasonably dangerous for use in the off-label treatment, because
the drug manufacturer failed to directly warn the consumer of the
drug's dangerous propensities. A patient may also recover even
where the direct warning to the consumer was adequate, i.e., as
present on the drug product's labeling, but thereafter became
diluted or even vitiated by a manufacturer's over promotion of the
206 Such resistance likely stems from the differences in legal versus medical approaches
to decision making, which are often summarized as adversarial versus scientific methods.
Understandably, many physicians are unwilling to relinquish their clinical authority to
non-medical parties, especially to lawmakers sitting in judgment (prospectively or
retrospectively) of clinical decisions. See Peter D. Jacobson & M. Gregg Bloche,
Improving Relations Between Attorneys and Physicians, 294 JAMA, 2083, 2083-85
(2005).
207 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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drug. 208 Any promotion about a drug's off-label effectiveness to
the end user, therefore, could make the drug manufacturer liable
for any damage caused by the drug in the off-label use.
Tort liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers promoting off-
label uses can also stem from a variety of negligence claims, e.g.,
failing to seek FDA approval of the marketed off-label use,
improper labeling, promotion of an off-label use of an FDA
approved drug, fraud based on the alleged misbranding, and fraud
upon the FDA. 209 Fraud actions have also been brought against
drug manufacturers by individual states under various consumer
fraud laws. For example, in 2004, the New York Attorney General
brought a civil lawsuit against pharmaceutical manufacturer
GlaxoSmithKline, alleging that the company committed fraud by
disseminating information about the off-label use of Paxil®
(paroxetine) for treating depression in pediatric patients while, at
the same time, withholding negative clinical data about the drug's
effectiveness for that off-label indication.1 ° In the settlement
agreement, GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay $2.5 million in
disgorgement and costs to the State of New York and agreed to
publish summaries of all company-sponsored clinical trials since
December 2000 (the date Glaxo Wellcome and
208 This dilution theory generally occurs when a drug manufacturer has effectively
watered down its regulations-required warnings by causing either its sales representatives
or its DTC advertisements to promote a wider use of the drug, to physicians or
consumers, respectively. See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 222 (Pa. 1971)
(holding that a drug manufacturer can be held to have breached his duty of reasonable
care by promoting its product in such a manner as to nullify the printed label warnings);
accord Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973).
209 See James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and
Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 295, 316 n.127 (2003) (citing Buckman v. Plaintiffs Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341
(2001) and noting that "a direct claim of fraud upon the FDA would probably be rejected
under the Supreme Court's approach in the comparable claim of medical device fraud")
2 10 The Complaint also alleged that GlaxoSmithKline failed to properly disclose the
mixed clinical trial results to physicians in medical information letters. Complaint at 10-
11, 14-16, New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, P.L.C., Civil Action No. 04-CV-5304 MGC
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2004), available at
http://fl 1 .findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo6O2O4cmp.pdf.
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SmithKlineBeecham merged). 211  Under these hard-line terms,
GlaxoSmithKline became the first major drug manufacturer to
disclose publicly information on clinical drug trials. The case also
demonstrated the effectiveness of pursuing off-label promotion
under state fraud laws.212
Federal fraud claims can be brought against a drug
manufacturer for promoting off-label uses that result in the
submission of false or fraudulent claims for reimbursement to the
U.S. government, under the False Claims Act (FCA).213 By its
express terms, the FCA encompasses all types of fraud or
misrepresentation that can result in financial loss to the federal
government, which includes healthcare fraud.2 14  The FCA has
been interpreted by a minority of courts to require only the
presentation of a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,
without the additional element of a false record or statement.215
Under such construction, even truthful, non-misleading statements
made by drug manufacturers about the effectiveness of their drug
products in off-label uses will constitute fraudulent representations
under the FCA, if the government will not reimburse for those
uses. 2 16 Increasingly, the FCA is being used for this very purpose,
in qui tam or "whistleblower" actions (brought by an individual on
behalf of the government), to police off-label promotion and to
211 Consent Order & Judgment at 6, New York v. GlaxoSmithKline, P.L.C., Civil
Action No. 04-CV-5304 MGC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/aug26a 04 attachl.pdf.
212 See Press Release, Office of the State of New York Attorney General Press Releases,
Settlement Sets New Standard for Release of Drug Information: Glaxo to Establish
"Clinical Trials Register" with Information on All Company Drugs (Aug. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/aug26a_04.html.
213 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (2005).
214 See Ralph F. Hall & Robert J. Berlin, When You Have a Hammer Everything Looks
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 653, 653-55 (2006).
215 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. 96-11651, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (citations omitted).
216 Id. at *6 (holding that the only issue under § 3729(a)(1) is whether a false claim was
presented to the government, and § 3729 does not require that the "cause" be fraudulent
or otherwise independently unlawful). But see Hall & Berlin, supra note 214; Edmonds
v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (D. Fla. 2006).
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obtain large judgments or settlements from pharmaceutical
manufacturers engaging in aggressive drug marketing strategies.21 7
The most high-profile use of the FCA in recent years has been
in the Neurontin® (gabapentin) litigation. Neurontin® was
approved by the FDA in 1994 for use as a supplemental anti-
seizure treatment in epilepsy patients and broadly marketed by the
Parke-Davis division of Warner-Lambert, and then Pfizer.
2 18
Between 1995 and 2002, Neurontin®'s sales increased
significantly and extended well beyond the relatively small
epilepsy market to cover a variety of off-label populations,
including patients suffering from pain disorders, migraines, bipolar
disease, attention deficit disorder, restless leg syndrome and drug
and alcohol withdrawal.2t 9
An investigation of Warner-Lambert's marketing practices
began in 1996, when a former medical liaison for Warner-Lambert
filed a qui tam suit under the FCA, claiming that the company had
used fraudulent means to promote increased prescriptions of
Neurontin® for off-label uses. 220 The former employee alleged,
and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) later concluded, that the
company's marketing efforts had included direct promotion of off-
label uses to physicians and the Department of Veterans Affairs,
financial underwriting of sham drug studies for off-label uses,
offers of cash payments to physicians for reporting their
prescribing practices, and various gifts and kickbacks to physicians
217 The FCA provides for both treble damages (i.e., three times the amount of the false
claim submitted to the government) and fines of between $5,500 and $11,000 per
fraudulent claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2005); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (1999). The qui tam
plaintiff or whistleblower will receive 15-25% of the recovery, if the government joins
the action, and 25-30% if the government does not. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(l)-(2) (2005).
According to the FCA Legal Center, FCA judgments and settlements against fraud-
feasors in the last 11 years have totaled over $12 billion. See Taxpayers Against Fraud
Education Fund website: Top 20 Cases, http://www.taf.org/top20.htm (last visited Sept.
12, 2007).
218 Warner-Lambert, including the Parke-Davis division, was acquired by Pfizer, Inc. in
2000. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44-45 (D. Mass.
2001).
219 Id. at 45. See also Press Release, The U.S. Department of Justice Press Release,
Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability
Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04 civ_322.htm.
220 Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46.
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for increasing their Neurontin® prescriptions for unapproved
uses. 22  Ultimately, a global settlement was reached. Warner-
Lambert agreed to pay the United States over $430 million in
penalties for its conduct. 222 Since the 2004 settlement, numerous
other pharmaceutical manufacturers have made equally large
payments to the government to settle FCA claims involving off-
label marketing.223
Last, but certainly not least, is FDCA liability. Off-label
promotion by drug manufacturers, in contrast to off-label
prescription by physicians, is directly actionable under the FDCA.
The FDCA provides for broad enforcement of off-label marketing
violations through administrative, civil, injunctive and criminal
actions, instituted by the FDA or the DOJ on behalf of the
Department of Health and Human Services and the FDA.
Penalties for off-label promotion under the FDCA are extensive
and can include administrative seizure of drugs, injunctive relief
against unlawful promotional activities, civil monetary penalties,
disgorgement of profits, production step-downs, and related
criminal penalties.224
Criminal liability can also attach under the FDCA for off-label
promotion under the misbranding provisions, interpreted to provide
"no adequate directions for [the off-label] use," and then for
manufacturing or otherwise placing that product into interstate
221 Id. (noting that the case remained under seal for several years until 1999 when the
DOJ announced the results of its investigations). Since then, many studies have assessed
the impact of the such marketing practices on physicians. See, e.g., Michael A. Steinman
et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry
Documents, 145 ANN. INTERN. MED. 284, 284-93 (2006) (concluding that the
pharmaceutical promotion of Neurontin® strongly influenced clinical decision-making
by physicians).
222 The former employee received a financial windfall of approximately $24.64 million,
as a portion of the civil recovery. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, supra
note 219.
223 As reported by the FCA Legal Center, the top 20 recoveries to date include a $704
million settlement by Serono, $435 million by Schering-Plough, $266 million by
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, and $257 million by Bayer Corp. These settlements
resolved both civil liabilities and associated criminal charges relating to allegations of
marketing fraud. See Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund website: Top 20 Cases,
http://www.taf.org/top20.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
224 See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 333-34 (2003).
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commerce for such use. 225  In the Warner-Lambert global
settlement, Warner-Lambert agreed to plead guilty to two counts of
criminal misconduct under the FDCA with regard to Neurontin®
misbranding, for failing to provide adequate directions for use and
for introducing into interstate commerce an unapproved new drug.
For these violations Warner-Lambert paid over $200 million in
criminal fines.226
Over the past decade, the FDA and federal prosecutors have
aggressively initiated misbranding actions against pharmaceutical
and generic drug companies, pursuing both civil and criminal
claims under the FDCA. Many consider such measures excessive.
Historically, FDA enforcement began and ended with the public
issuance of a Warning Letter or another punitive and precautionary
statement to the drug manufacturer for promoting the off-label use.
Few Warning Letters resulted in actual prosecution, as the public
opprobrium surrounding each written reprimand was thought to
serve as a sufficient penalty to fit the company's crime. 227 Indeed,
the use of these warnings by competitors in the market can create
negative press that is more harmful and costly to a company than
litigation itself.
More recently, however, the DOJ has taken an aggressive
position on the criminal enforcement of off-label drug promotion
by pursuing misbranding violations as federal crimes. The first
criminal prosecution of a drug company for illegal promotion of a
drug for unapproved uses was against Genentech in 1999, for its
marketing practices surrounding the company's first product,
228Protropin® (somatrem for injection) growth hormone. This
225 The misbranding charge is derived from 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a) and 352(f) (2004)
("adequate directions for use"). See also supra notes 131 and 132 and accompanying text.
226 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 219.
227 All Warning Letters and Responses are available to the public and are posted online,
at the FDA's Freedom of Information Reading Room website. See FDA's Electronic
Freedom of Information Reading Room - Warning Letters and Responses,
http://www.fda.gov/foi/waming.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
228 Protropin® growth hormone was the first therapeutic protein product to be
manufactured and marketed by a biotechnology company. Genentech received FDA
approval to market the drug in 1985. See Genentech: About Us,
http://www.gene.com/gene/about/corporate/history/timeline/index.jsp (last visited Sept.
12, 2007).
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landmark case resulted in a settlement of over $50 million to settle
the off-label promotion and marketing allegations ($30 million in
criminal fines and $20 million in civil settlement).229 Since then, a
surfeit of other lawsuits have been filed with conjoint criminal and
civil claims under the FDCA °
Further evidence of the ever-expanding scope of federal
prosecution for off-label promotion occurred in April 2006. There,
an individual physician consultant was arrested and charged with
participating in the unlawful promotion of Xyrem® (gamma-
hydroxybutyrate or GHB) for off-label uses on behalf of the drug's
manufacturer, Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Inc.231  The indictment
charged that the doctor, both individually and as part of a
conspiracy with the manufacturer, introduced a misbranded drug
into interstate commerce and committed healthcare fraud.232 In
July 2007, a settlement was reached between the drug
manufacturer and the United States Attorney's Office. The
manufacturer agreed to pay $20 million in penalties and victim
compensation to resolve parallel criminal and civil
investigations. 233  The criminal misbranding charges that remain
229 In its plea agreement, Genentech admitted that it aggressively marketed Protropin®
for uses other than the one approved by FDA. Protropin® had been approved for long-
term treatment of children with growth hormone deficiency, but was being marketed and
sold for the treatment of bums, childhood obesity and certain kidney disorders. See Plea
Agreement, United States v. Genentech, Inc., Criminal No. 99-cr-0141-MJJ (N.D. Ca
1999), entered May 7, 1999.
230 For example, see the reported cases involving both criminal and civil settlements for
FCA and FDCA claims, supra note 219.
231 Press Release, The U.S. Att'ys Off., E. Dist. of N.Y., Psychiatrist Charged With
Conspiracy to Illegally Market the Prescription Medication Xyrem, Also Known as
"GHB, " For Unapproved Medical Uses on Behalf of Its Manufacturer (Apr. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006aprO5.html. See also, e.g.,
Alex Berenson, Indictment of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/business/22drugdoc.html.
232 See Press Release, Psychiatrist Charged With Conspiracy, supra note 231. The
relevant statutes are: 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 333(a)(2) (2006) (misbranding); 18 U.S.C. §§
1347, 1349 (2006) (healthcare fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (aiding and abetting).
233 The government's investigation began after a whistleblower suit was filed under the
FCA by a former sales representative for Orphan Medical, a subsidiary of Jazz
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The civil settlement included payment to Medicaid participating
states to resolve the FCA claims. The plea agreement included a guilty plea to one count
of felony misbranding of a drug product for off-label uses under the FDCA. Press
Release, The U. S. Att'ys Off., E. Dist. of N.Y., Jazz Pharm., Inc. Agrees to Pay $20
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pending against the individual physician are duly acknowledged to
have "raised questions about free-speech issues and the
government's right to regulate the practice of medicine." 234
One final example of individual criminal liability arising under
the FDCA is the DOJ's targeted prosecution of pharmaceutical
company corporate executives for off-label marketing. In May
2007, three senior executives of Purdue Frederick Company, Inc.
and the company itself pled guilty to charges involving the
criminal misbranding of OxyContin® (oxycodone), under the
doctrine of vicarious liability as applied to the FDCA. 235  The
Attorney General's Office advanced a rarely used theory that the
executives were "responsible corporate officers" at the time the
violations occurred and, thus, could be held strictly liable for
failing to either prevent in the first instance or promptly correct the
introduction of the misbranded drug into interstate commerce. 236
Under the terms of the settlement, the company will pay over $ 100
million in civil penalties, and the individuals will pay over $34
million in disgorgement and criminal fines. 237
By all accounts, this sedulous enforcement activity is expected
to be just the tip of the iceberg. The DOJ is believed to have over
Million To Resolve Criminal and Civil Allegations In "Off-Label" Marketing
Investigation (July 13, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2007/
2007jul 13a.html.
234 Alex Berenson, Maker of Narcolepsy Drug Pleads Guilty in U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/14/business/14jazz.html.
235 See Information, Attachment F to Plea Agreement, United States v. Purdue Frederick
Co., Inc., Civil Docket No. 07-CR-29 JPJ, filed May 9, 2007, available at
http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/Main-Document.pdf.
236 Id. at 3-4. See also Ropes & Gray Client Alert, DOJ Intensifies Pressure Against
Corporate Executives in Off-Label Marketing Arena (May 24, 2007), available at
http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/713dad55-e014-43d7-85ac-
1a589bl 5e542/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/840adccf-b lbO-4f8a-82db-
le30fele7l12/AlertMay_24_2007_DOJ.pdf.
237 Civil Settlement Agreement, United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., Inc., Civil
Docket No. 07-CR-29 JPJ; Plea Agreement as to Michael Friedman; Plea Agreement as
to Howard R. Udell; Plea Agreement as to Paul D. Goldheim; all filed May 7, 2007, all
documents available at http://www.vawd.uscourts.gov/PurdueFrederickCo/default.asp.
In addition, the executives were sentenced to three years' probation and 400 hours each
of community service in drug treatment programs. See Barry Meier, 3 Executives Spared
Prison in OxyContin Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, available at
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/21/business/21 pharma.html.
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150 investigations of pharmaceutical companies ongoing,
238involving 500 or more products. Pharmaceutical manufacturers
would be well advised to operate under effective compliance
programs if they wish to avoid the prosecutorial limelight. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that, to date, the criminal
prosecutions have made no clear distinction between the promotion
of truthful information about the effectiveness of off-label
indications and false or misleading claims for those uses. Judicial
guidance on this point is scarce, because virtually all of the
lawsuits have resulted in settlements and plea agreements.
Companies are unwilling to take the risks associated with going to
trial, including the risk of exclusion from participation in federal
and state healthcare programs. 239 For this reason, the true limits on
the FDA's regulatory power to restrict off-label promotion has not
been tested.
As was argued in criticism of the aggressive use of the FCA,
any legal theory used to collect hundreds of millions of dollars in
penalties and fines should be based upon a firm legal basis, or else
it should trigger an extensive analysis of the law and the
underlying policy by legislatures, courts, policy makers and
academics.240 The final section of this Note reviews the currently
ongoing analyses and debates surrounding FDA law and policy.
D. Proposals for FDA Reform
Determining what is prudent and practical public policy in the
healthcare sphere is a constant challenge. Recently, the
government has tipped the scales towards the end of tightly
restricting drug promotion and the drug manufacturer's freedoms
to inform the public about their products. However, this trend may
not reflect an adequate balancing of innovator versus generic
interests, as innovator pharmaceutical manufacturers are plainly
238 John R. Wilke, Cases, Fines Soar in Fraud Probes, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2005.
239 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2005). This section provides for both mandatory
exclusion, upon conviction of a criminal offense relating to healthcare fraud or the
"delivery of an item or service," and permissive exclusion, in which the government
determines that certain forms of misconduct have occurred.
240 Hall & Berlin, supra note 214, at 674.
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being more heavily targeted by the DOJ.2 4 1  Accordingly, any
proposed framework for improving FDA supervision and/or
government enforcement in the context of the production and
dissemination of information concerning off-label drug use must
be evenhanded and effect a syncretic balance between the interests
of innovators, generics, physicians and the public.
The next wave of FDA reform must also consider patent issues.
Pharmaceutical lobbyists have long argued for better integration
and consideration of the fairness of the FDCA and the
corresponding FDA regulations in view of the patent laws and
regulations. This monstrous task is quickly coming to a head with
the emergence of follow-on biologics (FOBs), otherwise known as
generic biologics or biosimilars. As patents and exclusivity rights
are expiring on biotechnology drugs, i.e., drugs made by biological
processes, a competitive but highly lucrative market in protein
therapeutics is rapidly opening up for FOBs.242 There is currently
no FOB industry in the U.S. because there is no established way
for the FDA to regulate the production and distribution of generic
drugs made through living organisms. 243  Legislators are, thus,
wrestling with the difficult task of how to construct a regulatory
mechanism that assures the safety and efficacy of FOBs that are
241 Any endorsement of increased innovator liability, as a form of noblesse oblige for
having gained a foothold in the blockbuster drug market, is outdated. A golden era for
generic drugs is arriving, as many of the seminal patents on blockbuster medications are
expiring. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, More Generics Slow Rise in Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/business/08generic.html?
ex=1344225600&en=e 155928a7a 102156&ei=5088&partner-rssnyt&emc-rss (observing
that over the next five years, patents will expire in brand name medications with more
than $60 billion in combined annual sales and bring forth a "tidal wave of generic
drugs").
242 Biotech drugs are the fastest growing segment of the pharmaceutical market. Overall
sales for therapeutic proteins are expected to top $57 billion by 2010. Some of the largest
biotech drugs soon to go off patent include: Genentech's Nutropin® (patent expires in
2009); and Amgen's drugs Procrit®, Neupogen® and Epogen® (all patents expire by
2013). Bruce S. Manhein, Jr. et al., 'Follow-On Biologics': Ensuring Continued
Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFF. 394, 395 (2006).
243 Biotech drugs are produced by bacterial or mammalian cells that have been
genetically engineered to produce the therapeutic protein. Traditional generics legislation
deals only with generic drugs based on molecular compounds that can be produced
synthetically. See supra Part I.
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more difficult to produce than traditional generics and thus more
difficult to substitute for the innovator drugs.244
Although the topic is well beyond the scope of this Note, in
many ways, the issues confronting FOBs magnify those that exist
for the unapproved uses of drugs.24 5  FOBs cannot be approved
with the same ease or frequency as traditional generic drugs. Off-
label indications are not being approved at the same frequency as a
drug's first indication. The seeming inability to craft appropriate
regulations for both sets of circumstances stems from the inherent
difficulties associated with the trade-off between the costs of FDA
approval and the desired access and availability of drugs in the
marketplace. Ultimately, for FOBs, far more than for unapproved
drug indications, a full complement of data will likely have to
appear alongside the product to assure drug safety and efficacy.
Setting aside the issue of biologic drugs and FOBs, various
other legislation has touted the benefits of data-heavy or evidence-
based medicine, to minimize the uncertainty or guesswork
involved in prescribing newly approved drugs.246  Proponents of
these reformative measures recognize that unproven off-label
prescribing practices can be harmful in some instances, for
244 Id.; See also Andrew Pollack, In Biotech Brews, Questions of Consistency, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2007, available at www.nytimes.com/2007/06/1 1/business/
businessspecial3/1 Ivat.html; Bernadette Tansey, Are We Ready for Generic Biotech?
Safety Concerns-and Enormous Profits-at Issue as Industry Braces for Copycat Drugs,
S.F. CHRON., July 15, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
f-/c/a/2007/07/15/BUGC2QVJIQ1 .DTL.
245 In fact, proposals were made to include the proposed biologics legislation in the
same bill that addressed many issues surrounding drug safety and off-label uses of drugs.
A combined FDA bill was approved by the Senate (see discussion infra text
accompanying notes 248-251), but the merged bill was highly controversial, and
ultimately it was decided that the biologics bill would need to be taken up separately. See,
e.g., Anna Wilde Matthews, House Acts to Boost FDA Powers; Biotech Fight Looms,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 2007.
246 Evidence-based medicine aims for the ideal that medical practitioners should make
conscientious, explicit, and sensible use of current best evidence in their everyday
practice. It advocates the use of evidence in the decision-making aspects of medicine that
depend on rational assessments of the risks and benefits of treatments. See Evidence-
based Medicine, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidence-based-medicine (as of
Sept. 12, 2007, 2 1:00 GMT); see also A.S. Elstein, On the Origins and Development of
Evidence-Based Medicine and Medical Decision Making, 53 INFLAMM RES., SUPPL.
2:S184-9 (2004).
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example, where an inefficient prescription could have been
substituted for a more effective one. Numerous studies have
indicated a need for more extensive post-marketing surveillance
and risk assessment of approved drugs, to identify non-evidence-
based prescribing practices and to distinguish those that are
clinically reasonable from those that may be of concern.2 4 7
To this end, Congress undertook major legislative reform this
year, to give the FDA increased financing to perform periodic
reviews of approved drug usage and to require pharmaceutical
companies to make data on active clinical trials publicly available
and to perform post-approval studies.248 The Senate version of the
legislation authorized a lengthy process for post-market FDA
safety review of approved drugs and supplements, with improved
analytical tools to assess potential safety problems.249  The
legislation also sought to improve FDA surveillance of adverse
effects throughout the life cycle of a drug product, in part by
requiring better post-marketing diagnostics and systematic
evaluations of off-label usage via its "risk evaluation and
mitigation strategy.' '250 The House version of the legislation added
247 A current problem with approved drugs is that post-market surveillance and late
phase (i.e., phase 4) clinical trials are all too often either not conducted or else negative
outcomes go unreported and are inaccessible to the public. See Radley, supra note 134, at
1025-26.
248 On May 9, 2007, the Senate passed S. 1082, "An Act to Amend the FDCA and the
Public Health Service Act to Reauthorize Drug and Device User Fees and Ensure the
Safety of Medical Products, and For Other Purposes," sponsored by Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy and also known as the FDA Revitalization Act or the Enhancing Drug Safety
and Innovation Act of 2007. See also, e.g., Harris, supra note 177 (discussing the need
for the legislative proposals to improve public safety monitoring of approved drugs whilst
encouraging clinical innovation); Christopher Lee, Senate Approves Bill on Drug
Monitoring, WASH. POST, May 10, 2007; Robert Pear, Senate Approves Tighter Policing
of Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/05/10/washington/iOdrug.html?partner-rssnyt&emc=rss. The House of
Representatives recently passed similar legislation, H.R. 2900, "The Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007," on July 11, 2007. See Lisa Richwine, Bill on
Drug Safety, FDA Funding Clears House, REUTERS, July 12, 2007.
249 See S. 1082, 110th Cong. § 102 (2007). The version as passed by the Senate
removed provisions that limited the post-market safety activities to three years after
approval of a new drug.
210 See S. 1082, § 201 (setting forth FDCA amendments to establish minimum standards
to collect and assess post-marketing electronic health data in a post-market risk
identification and analysis system). For a summary of the reform elements, see Mark
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more severe penalties for violations of FDA safety laws, by
authorizing increased civil monetary fines for repeated false or
misleading DTC drug advertisements.251
Another major purpose of the FDA reform legislation was to
renew, from fiscal year 2008 through 2012, the program in which
the drug industry pays user fees to the FDA.252 The user fee
system is intended to encourage drug makers to assess efficacy and
safety issues earlier in drug development, to defray the
administrative cost of reviewing new drug products and
indications, and to assist in bringing new therapies to market more
quickly. 253  Overall, the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments of 2007 ("FDAA") represent the largest overhaul of
FDA's safety authority since 1962. The new law is sure to have
both protective and pernicious effects-steps to enhance safety and
monitoring of drug use will necessarily increase costs and restrict
access to beneficial drugs. At its core, the FDAA gives the FDA
increased power to act to ensure the continued safety of drugs post-
approval and throughout the full life cycle of every drug product.
New regulations or guidelines will undoubtedly be drafted to
implement the FDA's new authority.
McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at the FDA-Pendulum Swing or Systematic
Improvement?, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1700-02 (2007).
251 Additional provisions permit the FDA to require pre-review of DTC advertisements.
See Lisa Richwine, Drug Safety Legislation Clears U.S. House Panel, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 21, 2007.
252 Both H.R. 2900 and S. 1082 contained the proposed legislation, titled "Prescription
Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007" (PDUFA IV), to renew the Prescription Drug User
Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (renewed as part of the FDAMA
and reauthorized in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, FDCA §§ 735-736), which
was set to expire in late September 2007. The House and Senate reached an agreement
on omnibus FDA reform legislation just in time. The House passed H.R. 3580, the FDA
Amendments Act of 2007, which includes PDUFA IV (but does not contain any
provisions concerning FOBs), on September 19, 2007. The Senate also passed the reform
legislation by unanimous consent on September 20, 2007. The legislation was signed
into law by President Bush on September 27, 2007. Food and Drug Administration
Amendments of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
253 See, e.g., The Associated Press, Congress Moves to Increase Spending on Drug
Safety, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 11, 2007.
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CONCLUSION: THE BIG PICTURE
The rapid pace of discovery in the biotechnological and
medical sciences over the last few decades has brought with it
increased pressure on the FDA to expedite the approval process for
254potential new therapeutics. Recent legislative proposals on
FOBs provide a prime example of immediate efforts to make
medications available more quickly to the public. Yet, such efforts
are coupled with scant measures to address the long-term safety
implications of such changes. The FDA is in a constant state of
playing catch up, as evidenced by the swift passage of the
FDAA. 255
Perhaps, the largest shift in the drug landscape over the last
several decades has been the introduction of generic drug
competition, both domestic and offshore, which has served to shift
the regulatory balance away from drug safety and towards drug
access and availability. From a market standpoint, the mere
presence of generic drugs stifles the incentives of pharmaceutical
companies to obtain further patent protection on and regulatory
approval for new uses of approved drugs already on the market,
because of a limited ability to recover against generic drug
manufacturers for inducing patent infringement through crossover
sales of generics for off-label uses.256
The medical community has also felt the effects of increased
competition in the drug marketplace. Although an increase in drug
availability can enrich patient care, at the same time, healthcare
professionals are stymied in their ability to learn about off-label
uses and to encourage further research and development on such
uses. Most physicians simply do not have the time to conduct
research on off-label uses and to assess contradictory findings.
The healthcare imbroglio that ensues is reminiscent of the standard
operating procedure in a James Bond film, where the professionals
are given increasingly sophisticated and powerful professional
gadgets, but are only able to use them under challenging and
compromised conditions.
254 See Stepp, supra note 18, at 3.
255 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
256 See discussion supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
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Efforts to quicken the pace at which drugs are approved and
brought to market naturally shift the risk of liability for harm to
later post-marketing stages of the drug lifecycle. The last few
years have shown a direct relationship between attempts to
accelerate drug approval and corresponding attempts to more
stringently regulate drug promotion and marketing. The inherent
tension between pre-market approval and post-market surveillance
has a long history. A review of the past century of the FDA is
instructive in that it provides a comprehensive framework for
evaluating proposals for future change in the FDA's administrative
authority and regulation of pharmaceutical drug approval and
promotion. Efforts to improve the future should always reflect
upon the past.
On one view, the FDA has come full circle in exerting its
gatekeeper role in the healthcare industry by means of controlling
drug labeling in the broadest sense. From its initial monitoring of
fraudulent drug safety claims to its current surveillance of
promotional labeling claims, the FDA has long endeavored to
protect the public health through its restrictions on drug labels. It
is perhaps not surprising that the FDA has been somewhat mired in
its efforts to control an inherently uncontainable market. Drug
labeling restrictions are always post-hoc efforts to disclaim harm.
Moreover, such constraints are likely to promote the exercise of
behavior and practices that push the restrictive boundaries, simply
to determine the marge de manoeuvre (i.e., wiggle room) within,
as well as to see how far they can extend beyond.
These and other factors explain why the FDA's voluble
attempts to regulate drug safety have been disparaged for failing to
adequately address drug accessibility and vice versa. It is
unfortunate that, in the politically charged public sector, squeaking
hinges are the ones that get oiled and decisions are made that are
not always balanced. The inherent unpredictability of the private
sector economy further serves to emphasize the indomitable nature
of healthcare and why much of the FDA's work consists of
forming and reforming policy, in perpetual catch-up mode.
A safe and effective drug marketplace that both meets
consumer needs and protects consumer interests is the great
desideratum. FDA regulations will undoubtedly continue to shift
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and sway to appease diverging public and private sector interests.
Valuable reform efforts seek to achieve an acceptable level of
regulatory oversight that balances the complex economic and
policy objectives of meeting consumer demand for safe,
efficacious and affordable healthcare with the ongoing needs of the
medical community and the private sector innovators. The real
function of the FDA is, and always will be, to best enable the
medical professionals and pharmaceutical industries to provide
treatment for disease, but to do no harm.
Notes & Observations
